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ACIMG SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PREFA- 
This repDrt was prepared by a group of experts appointad by 
the late Seuetary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, under General 
Assembly resolution 1516 (XV) to assist him in conducting a study 
of the economic and social consquences of d i m e n t  in countrip 
with different economic systems and at different stages of econormc 
development. 
The members of the group acted in their p m m l  capacities and 
their observations and recommendations were put forward to me on 
thur own responsibility. I am convinced that their report rep-ts 
a major step forward in the consideration of the economic and d 
consequences of disarmament and 1 am plased to endorse their 
general findings. It is now my privilege to submit the report to the 
Economic and Social Council for its consideration and transmittal, 
along with its comments, to the General Assembly. 
The members of the group were: V. Y. Aboltin, Deputy Director, 
Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Academy 
of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Marnoun 
Beheiry, Governor, Bank of S u b  ; Arthur J. Brown, Head, Depart- 
ment of Economics, University of Leeds, England ; B. N. 
Head, The Delhi School of Economics, India; Aftab Ahmad 
Chid Economist, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistani 
Oskar Lange, Chairman, Economic Council, Council of Ministers of 
the Government of the Pe le's Republic of Poland ; W. W. Leontief, 
Professor of Economics, %award University, United States ; Jd 
Antonio Mayobre, Ambassador of Venezuela to the United States; 
Alfred Sauvy, Director, National Institute of Demographic Studies, 
Government of France ; and Ludek Urhan, Economic Institute, Czecho- 
slovakian Academy of Sciences. Mr. Sauvy was represented at the 
meetings of the second session of the group by Paul Paillat, also 
of the National Institute of Demographic Studies. Mr. Jacob L. Mosak, 
Director of the Division of General Economic Research and Policies 
of the United Nations Secretariat, served as Chairman. 
In preparing the report the ex rts had available replies of Gov- 
ernments to a note wrbale of the &re(nry-&neral on the economic 
and social consequences of disarmament, which was sent in accordane 
with the unanimous recommendation of the group. Communimtions 
on the subject were also received from a number of the specialized 
a p c i e s  of the United Nations. The replies of Governments, together 
wlth the relevant information from the specialized agencies, are re 
produced in part I1 of the report. 
The group was assisted in its work by members of the Secretariat 
from the Department of Economic and Social Affairs at United 
Nations Headquarters and from the Em&c Cornmiasion for Europe, 
colkborating in accordance with that Commission's resolution 1 (XVI) . 
It is everywhere recagnized that the probhms of dkamment 
considered in the present report are among the most vital before the 
United Nations today. In d e d i  with its economic and sochi con- 
rmmmt, 
herd and 
cmqlete. They have reviewed the resources devoted to military pw- 
$sts &d the pawfil uses tohi& ' t b ~  remurce~r "might 1k ut 
whkn' relkased. They have exadned 'the mmrsiorm ptablenlsi t& 
-nip& arise iurd the .ifnp&ct of disarmament on i n t w a a h d  
W m s  and bn aid fa* enmk development, and tkrep Slave codld 
'&ti& to some wid mnsequmtes of disamnmt .  a J -> 
* .  . ;* , . +; ; 
It is a source of profound gratification to me, as I ah sure it 
PeiIl ti to'all &vkmunmt~, that, dn - a subject 'that ,ha4 mtil 1rieEently 
Men so-beset by fdeologkal ~di%fsmces, i t  has now p d  for 
a gror?jpLof expetw dram from cotanhies dii  dxeremt ;emm,mic 
~shims h d  at di,fieent stages of ecmmic  eawmieelqmwt tolssach 
upanimous agrment, It i particukrly tht' the b 
mltativt Grbtrp should have reaced the unanimous roncWih .*t 
"dl the problems mid difficultitis of tranitiod bmeeted G$aJ I& 
armament could h i  met by appropriate national and intern&aJ 
tprtaswes",. 4 that "there ~hould thus $e no +doubt that thq diversion 
to peaceful purgoses. of the . resources ngry. in ititdry .uk r&ld he 
,+cmmpIished to fae benefit of all $ugtrieg 9 4  $3'9 thC +iipr&$ntht 
d wsrId eoonoritic and . ,  so$ mt@tjw1;, , , I N  , -,  . .  
I ,  
- .  -. .. . ., < . r )  
LETTER OF TRANSkllTTAL 
to the Acting S m - G e n e r a l  
We have the honour to submit herewith the study, Report on the 
Economic and Soca Conseqesences of Disamuwlsent, which we were 
invited to prepare in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1516 
IXV). 
An outline of the report was prepared during meetings held in 
Geneva between 7 and 18 August 1961, and the report was drafted 
during meetings held at the Headquarters of the United Nations between 
23 January and 16 February 1962. Mr, Jacob L. Mosak, Director of the 
Division of General Economic Research and Policies of the United 
Nations Secretariat, served as Chairman at both sessions. 
We are happy to be able to present, for your consideration, a 
unanimous report surveying the nature and magnitude of the economc 
and social benefits and he problems of conversion arising from dis- 
armament, together with the general lines on which the main problems 
can be solved. 
In preparing this report we have drawn, among other sources, 
upon the replies provided by Governments to a note verbale which was 
sent by the Secretary-Ckneral in accordance with a recommendation 
of the group. We should like to express our appreciation for these 
replies : in view of their authoritative nature, they are a valuable source 
of information and we have included them in part II of our report. 
The members of the Consultative Group wish to express their very 
profound gratitude for the valuable assistance which they received from 
the mernkrs of the Secretariat, without which their task could not 
have been completed. 
Respectfully yours, 
United Nations, New York 
16 February 1962 
Editorial note 
Volume I1 of this report, containing the replies of Governments 
and communications from specialized agencies on the economic and 
&a1 consequences of disarmament, is hi issued separately as an 
addendum to the present document, ~/3593&.1. 
INTRODUCTION 
I. Realization that the disarmament issue is im ortant-as irn- d portant as the survival of humanity itself-is worl -wide. This is 
exemplified by a ~esolution adopted m 1959 by the General Assmbfy 
in which the question is called "the most important one facing the world 
today", and in which Rope is expressed that "measures leading towards 
the goal of general and complete disarmament under dective inter- 
national control will be worked out in detail and a p e d  upon in the 
shortest possible tirne".l This sense of urgency springs mainly from the 
existence of a threat to mankind that has grown into one of mass 
destruction. But in part, also, it comes from the consciausness that the 
resources that make this threat possible, and many more resources 
devoted to Iess spectacularly destructive military uses, are being diverted 
from the tasks of lightwing the burdens and enriching the lives of 
individuals and of society. 
2. At the same time, it is seen that disarmament would a%ect 
individuals, countries and the entire world economy in many different 
ways. A substantial part of the world's labour force now earns its 
living, directly or ind~rectly, in meeting military demands. To redeploy 
this force for non-military purposes is an operation large enough to give 
rise to important problems of economic and social adjustment. Careful 
advance study is required for fufl advantage to be taken of the 
potential benefits disarmament could make possible. The fallowing 
chapters attempt a survey of the magnitude of both the benefits it would 
bring and the difficulties that would have to be overcome in the econwzic 
and social fields. 
3. In many respects the available data fall short of what is needed 
for a corn rehensive and uantitative analysis. Nevertheless, the broad f nature an magnitude of 9, e economic and' social benefits and the prob- 
lems of conversion arising from disarmament, and the general lines on 
which the main problems can be solved, emerge sufficiently clearly from 
what is already h w n .  
4. This Consultative Grou on the economic and social conse- P quences of disarmament has dea t with the subject on the assumption 
that disarmament, once agreed upon, would be general and cornpIete 
and also rapid. It has done so in the belief that this was the intention 
of the General Assembly resolution under which it was appointed: 
and also because this interpretation gives the clearest form to both the 
b-efits and the difficulties, thereby minimizing the risk that the latter 
will be under-estimated. 
-- 
'See O f i a l  Records of the Gunsrd Asamnbly, Fourteenth SesGon, S* 
plrrrrrrr# No. 16, resolution 1378 (XIV). 
a The text of General Assembly rtsolution 1516 (XV), under which the moup . . - - - appointed, is given in annex 1; 
2 E ~ n o r n i e  and roehi c o ~ ~ g  of dharrnarne~~, V d *  1 
5. The report represents the unanimous findings of the Con- 
sultative Group. It deals with the volume of resources devoted to 
military purposes and the peaceful uses to  which these resources might 
be put when released, and with the transitional or conversion problems 
that would arise, both at the aggregate level of national production and 
employment and in particular sectors of the economy. The impact of 
disarmament o n  international economic relations is studied as well as 
the effects of d~sarmament on the volume and framework of ad for 
economic development. Finally, some social consequences of disarma- 
ment are considered. 
CHAPTER 1 
RESOURCES DEVOTED TO MILITARY PURPOSES 
. 6. The most fundamental way in which disarmament affects 
q o n o ~ c  IiEe is through the liberation of the resources devoted to 
rnifitaiy use and their re-employment for peaceful purposes. This shift 
the composition of the aggregate demand for goods and services is 
~ i y p l y  a hrge-sale manifestation of a henomenon that is constantly B #kmg place in all economies as the emand for certain goods and 
services shrinks while the demand for other goods and services expands ; 
thus disarmament in its economic aspects should not be considered as a 
unique' phenomenon. Short-term shifts in demand on an even larger 
scale than that whicli would accompany any agreed disarmament pro- 
gramme have' qccurred when economies have been converted to war 
production, ' or -when they have undergone conversion to peacetime 
patterns of production at the end of the war. 
7. It is important, however, that countries, in preparing to dis- 
arm, should take stock of the various resources that disarmament would 
release for eaceful uses. Such a survey would facilitate economic 
planning an f adjustment at a11 Ievels, public and private, national and 
international. 
8. To assess the transitional problems that may arise and to 
determine the peacelut uses to which the resources released may be put, 
it is necessary to ascertain in some detail the volume and composition 
of resourcs so released. An approximation to the volume of resources 
that would be liberated by disarmament is provided by the published 
~fficial estii~lates of military expenditure.' On the basis of available 
data there a pears to be general agreement that the worId is spending 
roughly $12 8 billion annually on military account at the present time. 
This figure is equivalent to about 8-9 per cent of the world's annual 
output of dl goods and services; it is at least two-thirds of-and accord- 
ing to some estimates may be of the same order of magnitude a-the 
I entire national income of all the under-developed countries. It is close 
to the value of the world's annual exports of all commodities and it 
,Imrresponds to about one-half of the total resources set aside each year 
.for gross capital formation throughout the world. 
I 9. The world's armed forces now number about 20 million per- 
!sons. This figure does not include all those currently employed in 
,$upplying military goods or services directIy to the armed forces or in 
~roducing the raw materials, equipment and other goods that are needed 
mdirectly in the production ,of military supplies and services. The tob l  
, . 
'Available data on military expenditures in the national budgets of countries 
are given in annex 2, tables 2-1, 2-2 and 23. 
4 Eeonomik and mial EO- of dlrarmament, Y d  I 
of all persons in the armed forces and in all produdive activities resuIting 
from military expenditure may amount to well over 50 million. 
10. These figures demonstrate that the total volume of man- 
power and of other productive resour= devoted to military us? at the 
present time is very large indeed. The available data do not, however, 
make it possible to assess with the desired d ee of accuracy the volume 
of resources that disarmament would actua "ff ly release. For one thbg, 
the existing estimates may not be comprehensive: some ategoria of 
military expenditure may be excluded. Further, there may be consider- 
able inconsistency in the pricing of military output compared with the 
pricing of other production, as also in the relationship between the pay 
of the armed forces and civilian wages and salaries. For these and 
other reasons it would be wrong to interpret the share of d t a r p  
expenditure in total output as a precise measure of the real share d 
national resources aIIocated to military pur~oses, unless appropriate 
adjustments could be made for coverage, pnce differentials and other 
elements of incomparability. 
11. Although the data provide an inadequate basis for predse 
comparisons of the milhry burdens among countries, it a n  be safely 
asserted that within most countries military expenditure accounts for a 
very signscant proportion of total, ou ut. In many camtries the 
est~rnates of military expenditure range % tween 1 and 5 per cent of 
oss domestic product, while in others, pa+icularty in some of the 
&r countries, the corresponding ratio ranges between 5 and 10 
per cent. 
12. While the burden of armaments is wide-spread, the great 
bulk of the wortd's military expenditure is highly concentrated in a 
handful of countries. Available indications are that about 85 per cent 
of the world's military outlays is accounted for by seven countries-- 
Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the People's Repub- 
lic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States 
of America. Total military expenditure in all the under-developed 
countries amounts to about one-tenth of that of the industrid private 
enterprise economies. This means that although many under-developed 
countries devote significant proportions of their resources to military 
purposes, the great bulk of the resources released by dkrmmtnt 
would be concentrated in a very few countries.' 
13. It should be noted that an agreed disarmament programme 
would invoIve alternate security arrangements. Thus, the recent joint 
statement of the United States and the Soviet Union on agreed prin- 
ciples for disarmament negotiations provided that "During and after 
the implementation of the programme of general and complete dis- 
armament there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of 
the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain inter- 
national peace and security, including the obligation of States to place 
at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for 
'This is less true of manpower than of other resources, since the under- 
developed countries rely much more on numbers of men than on advataeed aad 
expensive armaments and equipment. 
an intemationaI ce force to be equipped with agreed types of 
rrrmament~".~ Whi f= c these arrangements would necessitate the continued 
a h t i o n  of funds and resources to m i l i t q  purposes, it m y  be assumed 
that these wwld be small in relation to current expenditure. 
14. In order to formuIate economic and social plicits so as to 
take full advantage of the opportunities afforded by disarmament, it is 
necessary for the countries concerned to know in detail the possible 
alternative uses for the resources released. In general it can be said 
that the ease and effectiveness with which the various resources liberated 
by disarmament night be employed for peaceful purposes would depend 
on the extent to which the composition of the demand for additional 
cirilian uses approximated that of the resources now devoted to arma- 
ments. Because of the relative immobility of some resources in the 
short run, systematic advance study is needed so as to minimize 
wastage in the transitional stage, though in the long run any country's 
Industrial capacity can be adapted to meet the changing pattern of 
demand. 
15. To prepare a list of the resources absorbed by armaments, 
I 
it is desirable that each country should, at the appropriate time, de- 
termine the composition of military expenditure and estimate the 
productive resources that it absorbs. The latter calctdation is straight- 
forward with respect to certain components of militay expenditure. 
The members of the armed form, for example, constitute a Iabour 
supply that would otherwise be available for peaceful purposes. 
Similarly, those research facilities empIoyed for military purposes 
which are adaptable to civilian research are rcadilv identified. Other 
productive resources, however, are devoted to military use only in 
an indirect manner which may not be apparent at first glance. While 
it is clear, for example, that the labour and capacity in ordnance pro- 
duction are employed solely for military purposes, it is impossible to 
state, without careful analysis, what proportion of the manpower and 
other resources devoted to, say, coal mining are so employed. If 
ordnance factories use any coal, some portion of the productive re- 
sources of the coal mining industry are engaged, indrrectly, in the 
production of armaments. But to take into account all the inter-industry 
relationships in a national economy in order to provide a complete 
picture of the resources absorbed far military purposes requirfs con- 
siderable statistical information and a thorough economic analysrs of an 
economy's productive structure. The degree of elaboration with which 
statistics should be compiled and economic analysis performed for this 
purpose varies from country to cotlntry according to the complexity 
and size of the national economy. Analogous considerattons apply to 
the determination of the amount of resources required directly and 
indirectly to satisfy alternative peacetime needs. 
16. Data made available by a number of countries show that 
military production is highly concentrated in a few industry groups, 
notably munitions, electrical machinery, instruments and related pro- 
ducts, and transportation equipment, including airplanes and missiles. 
I 
'See General Assembly document A/4879, Ioinf  S t u t ~ m l  on A$rasrt Pritl- 
&It# for Disammumt NegofiaEions, submitted by the Swict Uaion and & 
United States. 
6- Economk and d t  eonreqme~~8 of -4 Y& I 
There is a similar concentration in the same industries ' of the employ- 
ment resulting from military expenditure.* In most other industries 
military outlays account for a relatively small propoddn of tool 
demand. Industries dependent on military expenditure aIso have a high 
degree of concentration in certain regions and cities. While this pattern 
of concentration of output and employment is not necessarily character- 
istic of all countries, it appears to apply generally to the major 
military powers, 
17. The situation is rather di£ferent in those couhtries that rely 
upon imports for their supplies of military goods or in which -the 
majw p r t  of military expenditure is for the pay and gubsistence of. 
the armed forces, rather than for their equipment. In such cases, tb 
mourms devoted to miIitary purposes' consist essentially of manpower: 
and foreign exchange. This is especially true ,of the under:ded@. 
countries. While disarmament would require all countries- to make 
Liigfiifimnt adjustments, the reaIization of the great - potendal gains: 
from disarmament in underdeveloped countries would depend on a. 
major htensifiation of efforts to promote economic development, Such 
efforts would be facilitated in so far as niilitary spending were chan- 
nelled ta development expenditure and as scarce foreign .excbng! 
resources hitherto directly or indirectly utilized for military objectives' 
were freed far development purposes ; and stiIl more to  tht 'extent that' 
aid were forthcoming from the industrially advanced countries . in ,. the: 
form of both capital equipment and technical aisigtance. , . 
'St=, for ex-ample, the reply of the ~ ~ v e ~ m , m t  of the'United of 
Amenm. . . 
CHAPTER 2 
! THE PEACEFUL USE OF RELEASED RESOURCES 
18. There are so many competing clai~ns for usefully employing 
h e  resources released by disarmament that the real problem is to 
establish a scale of priorities. The most urgent of these claims would 
undoubtedly already have been largely satisfied were it not far the 
armaments race. 
19. The resources liberated by disarmament within any country 
could be employed in part to promote economic and social progress at 
home in part to expand foreign aid, The question of aid to under- 
developed countries is sufficiently important to warrant treatment in a 
separate chapter (chapter 6 ) .  The main civilian purposes for which the 
freed resources, whether domestic or foreign in origin, could be 
applied, may be classified as follows: 
Raising standards of personal consumption of goods and services; 
- Expanding or modernizing productive mpacity through investment 
. in new plant and equipment ; 
Promoting housing construction, urban renewal, including slum 
clearance, and rural development ; 
Improving and expanding facilities for education, health, welfare, 
' social security, cultural development, scientific research, etc. 
P-& of the gain from disarmament could also take the form of an 
increase in Ieisure as, for example, through a reduction in average 
working hours without a corresponding reduction in real income, or 
through an increase in paid vacations. 
20. The various claims u p n  resources Iisted above are, of course, 
closely interlinked. A rise in personal consumption may necessitate 
new investment in industry or agricuIture or both. Enlarged aid from 
the industrial to the under-developed countries may involve expanding 
capacity for the production of the goods that the latter countries need, 
notably capital equipment. As regards the under-developed countries 
fhemselves, if additional aid is to bring the greatest benefits, a larger 
vdurne of investment out of domestic resources is likely to be required ; 
this would be facilitated by the release of internal resources through 
disarmament. 
21. Since it can be assumed that the economy as a whole is 
high1 flexible in the long run, the resources freed by disarmament 
coulJultimately be used for any m e  or more of the purposes listed 
above, and in any combination. Labour can be retrained and, where 
necessary, can move to other areas. As old equipment becomes obsolete 
it can be repIaced by new equipment oriented to new patterns of 
demand. In the long run, there should be little diiculty in adapting 
resources to needs. 
22. ln the very short run, by contrast, the range of choice may 
be somewhat more limited. It takes time to turn swords into plough- 
shares or to make an office clerk or factory worker out of a soldser. 
Studies in some industrial countries have shown that the prductive 
capacities released from military use would k much more immediately 
adaptable to the increased output of consumer durables and industrial 
equ~prnent than to the production of houses, food, clothing or educa- 
tional facilities. Thus, in the transition period, countries may wish to 
take into account not merely the unsatisfied needs for higher can- 
sumption, investment and foreign aid, but also the extent to which 
alternative patterns of new expenditure would take fuU advantage of 
rticular resources that disarmament would make available. It 
sho d, however, be borne in mind that some of the major m i l i w  ~ = U Y  
powers now have fairly comfortable margins of productive capacity 
available to them. In these eases it is unlikely that disarmament would 
generate many new demands that could not fairly readily bc s a w  
from available resources.l 
23. In the centrally planned economies, even though they have 
pnerally been operating approximately at capacity, the transfer of 
industrial capacity and labour force to the production of gwds for 
peaceful uses cottld be achieved in a relatively short time. Ths tmsfer 
could be readily achieved by measures formulated within the framework 
of the general economic plans which can ensure a desirable balance 
between demand and resources. 
24. In the under-developed countries the principal resource 
released, apart from the purely financial, would be manpower, both 
skilled and unskiIIed. In some cases a significant pro rtim of in- 
dustrial and transport crapacity would also become ami P" able for otfitr 
uses. In many there would also be considerable savings in f d g n  
exchange. The effective utilization of r e l e a d  resources would depend 
upon the soundness and vipur of development programmes and the 
volume and character of aid received. 
25. Among the alternative uses of resources released by disarma- 
ment, increased personal consumption might well absorb a large share. 
It is fair to suppose that even in the developed countries there would 
be strong pressure on G o v e m e n t s  to raise the level, of living. Dis- 
armament would, in particular, offer an impartant opportunity b 
raise incomes of low incorne sections of the population and to facilitak 
equdizing the rates of pay for men and women. 
26. In most countries, however, not all the resources freed by 
dismmment would be allocated directly to consumption, no nmtter 
what the level of income might be. In the first pIae, a substantial 
portion of the released resources would be used for expansion of 
productive capacities because only such expansion can provide a firm 
basis for further increases in consumption. Ministers representing 
the countries of western Europe and North Acmeri~~. recwtl set as a 
collective target the attainment during the decade from 1 d to 1970 
of a growth in real gross national product of 50 per cent for all the 
countries taken together? In the Soviet Union, according to existing 
plans for economic development, industrial production should reach, 
in the course of the present decade, a level two and one half times the 
present volunle. A more rapid rate of growth would also enable m- 
tries with a higher degree of industrialization to contribute more ef- 
fectively-through greater financial and technical assistance and through 
the widening of markets for exporttito the development of countrie~ 
that are less advanced industrially. 
27. Recent experience in both private enterprjse and socialist 
economies provides a rough guide in judging how much additional 
investment a seecific growth target requires. Among the industrialied 
private enterprise economies, it appears that during the nineteen a e s  
a country experiencing a 4 per cent annual rate of growth needed, om 
the average, to devote about 2 per cent more of gross national product 
to investment than did a country having a 3 per cent rate of growth.8 
In most of these countries, 2 per cent would constitute a very significant 
proportion of the resources disarmament would release. In the less 
developed countries which have low levels of income and saving, the 
utilization of rel-d resources for capital formation must be con- 
sidered vitally important. 
28. S e a l  investment is an important alternative both to private 
consumption and to industrial and agricultural investment. Its A i m s  
rest partly upon the clear urgency of the direct need for improved 
s o d  amenities, and partly upon the fact that growth of industnal and 
agricultural roductivity is dependent upon developments in education, 
homing, beak and ofher fields. Since social invwtwnt has had to 
compete with military claims for state funds, it (like aid to under- 
developed countries) has probably been particularly affected by the 
armaments race. Recognition of the necessity to remedy the resulting 
ddciencies in the stock of social capital is wide-spread among cow- 
tries at different stages of economic development and with different 
economic systems. There is no common measure of need according to 
which it is possible to add up, or to compare, the deficiencies in diffemnt 
fields of social investment or different countries. Nevertheless, the 
'Organisation for Economic C-tion and Devtlmmt, Press CMn- 
miqu&, OECD/PRESS/A (61 10- (Paris) 17 Movemkr 1961. 1 *For further details see mted Na~ons, Wwld Economic S ~ m p ,  1959 
(Safcs~*.:60.II.C1),chap.1. 
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importact of the subject warrants an attempt to set out the main 
relevant pieces of evidence. 
29. - In the United States the Mationd Planning Association es- 
tiinated at the end of 1959 the cumulative expenditure requirements 
for selected government programmes over the next five years.' These 
estimates were not intended to be precise but simply represented a 
summary of the existing programmes of develo ment and improvement 
in mious fields over the next five years. T iL sigdcance of them 
estimates, which imply annual average expenditures of $66 billion, may 
be judged from the fact that the present spendmg of the Federal, State 
and lo& governments on all these programmes amounts to about $30 
bilIion per year. It is therefore apparent that these programmes could 
absorb much or most of any resources released by disarmament. 
30. In the Soviet Union the task has been set of achieving a sharp 
improvement in living standards within the next twenty years by raising 
the income of the population and also by expanding s o d  bend& 
(education, health protection, social insurance, housing constnrction, 
etc.). As stated in an official document, "general and complete dis- 
armament on t h e  basis of an appropriate agreement between States 
would make- it considerably easier to overfulfd the planned improveplent 
in the living standards of the working people"? 
31. It will be noted that the hrghest single figure among the 
programmes for the United States mentioned above is that for urban 
mwl avd d e v e l o p m t ,  including slum clearance, low-cost housing 
and community redevelopment. The problem of urhn renewal is world- 
wide. In 1950 about 80 per cent of the world's population was still 
living in rural areas. Between 50 and 60 million people are being added 
to the world's total population every year, mainly to its urban areas. 
In Asia as many as 500 million persons may be added h e e n  19% 
and 1975 to the population of cities with over 20,000 inhabitants. In 
Latin America, sixty-two cities with over 108,000 ple accounted 
in 1960 for son~e 40 per cent of the region's total. In I frica a consider- 
ably higher rate of growth is taking place in urban areas than in rural 
areas;. Rapid urbanization is characteristic of Europe and North 
America. 
32. The rural and urban environments in many cwntrics are both 
deteriorating, mainly under the irnpaet of this rapid growth. The social 
&National Planning Association, Loo$ng Ahad, Mar& W. The estitirates 
cavering tbe next five years were as folIows: 
(4' b i 3 l h )  ................... Education ...................... .........-....... 
Classroom construction 16 
30 ......................................... . , Current owration ............................................... I4 
Hi bways and s m y 8 . .  ........................................... 75 u r L  mpearal ............................. , ..... ,. roo 
(Slum clearance, Iow-cost housing and community redevelopment) ........................ .......... Water supply and conservation. ., 
Hcalth and hospitals.. 
' "Bo .............................................. 35 
Other programmes ................................................. 30 
. (Air pollution, research and devafopmnt, ctc.) * 
TOFAL. , =330 
m~rb~rarnrne of the Communist Party, adopted it.tho Z h d  Pam w. ' 
- 
and physicsl symptoms of this deterioration are bad h o u s i n g r  COI?- 
munity services and delinquency, the paralysis of city tra c, and m 
many of the less developed countries an absence of sanitation a- 
companied by a high incidence of mmmunic;able disease. In many 
metr olitan cities of such less developed countries uatters' settle- T "% ments already contain a considerable part of the p o p  tion. 
33. The magnitude of the resources required for dealing with the 
problem of urbanization is very la e. In India alone, for exampIe, 
?ppr+ately $1 billion a year w% be r uired to  h o w  the new 
lnhabltants of cities with over 100,000 A e .  The provision of d 
wide services, utilities and t-porkation would at least double 2; 
needed investment. In Latin America it was estimated by the Organiza- 
tion of American States in 1954 that an annual investment of $1.4 
billion was required over a period of thirty yaxs to wipe out the 
housing backlog, to replace obsolescent dwellings and to rovide homes 
for new households. According to rough estimates by the 8 nited Nations 
Bureau of Social Affairs, as many as 150 million families in the less 
developed countries are in need of adequate homes. These immense 
requirements are contributing in many under-developed countries to 
the maintenance of a level of spendin on housing and urban develop- 
ment such that the pressing claims o directly productive seetors have 
to be curtaiIed. 
B 
34. In the Soviet Union a housing shortage. still exists despite 
the building of dwellings for nearly 50 million pecpIe in the East five 
years. "The housing problem remains acute. The growth of the urban 
population in the Sov~et Union during the p s t  few years is consideribly 
in excess of the estirnate~."~ In order to overcome the shortage and 
house every family in "a separate, comfortable aparkment", an increase 
in twtinty years of about 200 per cent would be required in the existin 
housing facilities. To rach  this goal it is required that average ann 
housing construction be raised from the target of 135 million square 
metres in 1%165 to 400 mjllion square metres in 1976-80.P 
35. Another field in wbich the supply of social capital is deficient 
in many countries is road and air tratlspo~tatwn.~ The rapid increase 
in the stock of automobiles and the lag in road facilities in these cow- 
tries during the post-war years have been accompanied by extraordinary 
congestion and numbers of accidents. Airports and other air facilities 
are also deficient in many under-developed areas as well as in some more 
advanced economies, aad investment in civil aviation will claim a share 
of the resources freed by disarmament. 
36. The dm~opnmf avd E O ~ D S - ~ ~ O X  of tt~tpwd resour~e~ im- 
vides another important field for increased outlays in the event of dis- 
armament. In the United States it has been estimated that Federal 
N. Khrrrsbchtp, Re wt to rk 22ud Congress of the Co& Pwljr 
(Cmri C-b Prcrr. &w York, 1961). p. 118: 
'Re#wC on the ~~~~~~r of thc Commualst Party, delivered to thE Zhd 
P- Congress: Soviet ,Bmkle& ,No. 81 (London, 1%1), p. 47. 
ETUI countties as hdustrially advanced as the United States may bave such 
a de6acney. For txarnplk tht second largest figure in ttPe N a t i d  PI 
I M a t i o n  estimates cited in the fmtnoh to paragraph 29 is for highway= 
8kYwm. 
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expenditure requirements up to 1980 in the field of water resource 
development alone total almost $55 billion, while $173 billion will be 
needed for non-Federa1 propammes.@ The Soviet Union cottld advance 
the preparation and in~pIementation of a number of important nature- 
transforming projects in various parts of the country in order to 
improve living and workitig conditions for the people. There is, for 
example, a pIan to divcrt part of the waters of the Pechora, Vychegda 
and Ob Rivers illto the basins of the Volga and the Caspian and Aral 
Seas. This would bring ahout a considerable change in the cIi~nate and 
in living conditions in Ccntral Asia and in the southern European part 
of the Soviet Union. In under-deveIoped countries there are also many 
important mnltipurpose schemes for the conservation and the utilization 
of water resources. 
37. The world's demand for water is growing much more rapidly 
than the s~tpply, and a continuation of present trends implies a growing 
deterioration in the balance of demand and supply. Increasing supplies of 
water are needed not merely in order to keep pace with the rapid rise in 
population, but also in order to meet the still faster growing needs for 
irrigation and industry. In many countries most of the cheapest soitrce 
of supply for water have already been tapped, so that fttrther expansion 
of supplies necessitates increasingly heavy investment in obtaining 
access to other sources, including the purification of sea water. 
38. Other urgent requirements for natural resource development 
and conservation exist in the fields of forestry, soil and watershed 
conservation, rangeland conservation, park and recreational development 
and fish and wildlife conservation. In the United States the total Federal 
cost of proposed programmes in these areas over a period of ten years 
implies an annual rate of almost $4. billion, or almost twice the current 
rate of expenditure. In addition, scientific research and investigation 
in the heId of natural resources will have to be expanded at considerable 
cost. In  western Pakistan a master plan has been prepared for soiI 
reclamation and conservation in order to combat the twin menaces 
of water-logging and salinity. The cost during the next ten years is 
estimated at $1.2 billion. 
INVESTMENT IN HEALTH, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL SERVICES 
39. Ariother major itse of the resources released from disarma- 
ment is investment to raise standards of health, education and social 
services. There is an urgent need for improvement in health services 
throughout the world. In many countries the ratio of doctors, dentists 
and other medical personnel to the population is inadequate and even 
falling, and there are also great deficiencies in the supply of hospitals 
and hospital beds as wet1 as of other basic health facilities. The backlog 
that many countries have to make up in order to attain the hest current 
levels of hospital facilities is very large. In some of the poorer countries 
of Europe, for example, the medicaI facilities availaMe to each doctor 
have been estimated to be as little as one-fiftieth of those prevailing in 
the better e uipped countries. Yet even in the richest countries there 1 is great nec to improve standards of medical services. In Canada and 
- 
'See the reply of the Government of the United Statcs of America. 
the United States, for instance, the deficit in hospital beds has bem 
estimated at from a quarter to a half of the existing nurnber.1° In under- 
developed countries the need for improved medical care is obviously 
greater. This is indicated, for example, by infant mortality rates in 
excess of 100 per 1,000 in many of these countries as opposed to rates 
of 20 to 30 per 1,000 in economically advanced countries. 
40. An indication of the magnitude of investment requirements 
for m e d i d  care may be gained from projections for the United S~tes.  
The present rate of construction, plus a limited r o v e  of renova- 
tion, modernization and increase in rehabilitation h t i e s ,  would require 
at least $15 billion over the next decade instead of the $9 billion that 
would be needed if such changes were not carried out.11 In the Soviet 
Union it has been officially suggested that hospital accommdatiw might 
be increased by 40 per cent (that is, by several hundred thousand Ids) 
at low cost b converting into hospitals part of the buildings now in 
military use. d 
41. In most developed countries cducationaJ needs are rising and 
are bound to expand even more rapidly; with the ever wider spread 
of technical progress there will be a rising premium on a higher 
edumtional background, on htter scientific and technological &ills and 
on a broader range of knowledge. At the same time greater efforts will 
be directed towards reducing the drop-out rate of the less talented and 
towards ensuring that an increasing roportion of the highly taIented 
reach upper levels. The realization o ! JI these purposes would imply 
the devising of new kinds of education and provision of adequate means 
so that people keep abreast of the latest developments in howledge. 
42. In the United States, existing standards currently require an 
expenditure level of $20 billion for school enrolments in kinde y" through twelfth grade, and of $6.7 billion for institutions of rgher 
education. Projections on this basis alone indicate for 1970 a rise of SO 
p r  cent in the first ase and of more than 250 per cent in the second 
case. In a disarmed economy it would also be easier to meet the demands 
for better standards of education. 
43. According to recent estimates, western Europe's expenditure 
on education may rise from $9 bilIion in 1958 (including both current 
and capital outlays) to over $18 billion, on a high estimate, in 197G 
an increase of over 100 per cent.18 As a result, outlays for education 
may rise from 3.2 per cent of gross national product to 4,O per cent. 
Western Europe would also face important problems at the university 
level if a target were set for raising the European enrolment in the 20-24 
y a r  age roup from 5 per cent as at present to the United States ratio 
of over 3 per cent." 
"Royal Commission on Canada's Eonomic Prospects, Housing and S o d  
Capital (Ottawa, 19571, and mnud reports of thc United States Department of 
Health Education and Welfare (Washington, D.C.). 
See the reply of the Government of the United States of America. 
"Embassy of the Union of Soviet SoeiaIist Republics, Washington, D.C., 
I Pmss Dqmrt"pt M e a x  Na 65, 2 February 196d 
Orgamzatton for European Economic Co-operation, Twgsl  for Bdw&n 
t Earope, by Svennilson, Edding and Elvin, p. 105. 
I YDewhurst, Cop-, Yates and Associates, E~wropc's N e d s  and Rc~owrccr, 
I (New Yoyk, 1961) p. 343. 
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44, In the Soviet Union general and plytechnical mndary  
(eleven-year course) education for all children of school-going age is 
to be introduced in the next ten years. It is planned that the number of 
students resident in boarding schmls and extended day-are -1s 
should increase from 1.5 million at present to 2.5 million in 1965. The 
shortage of space in schools has led to using the building facilities in 
shifts; but teactdng on a shift basis is expected to stop completely in 
the near future. Besides the extension of secondary school facilities, 
it is estimated that the present enrolment of 2.6 million students in 
higher educational establishments will triple by 1980.16 All these devel- 
opments will require construction of many more schools and training of 
a large body of teachers, both of which would be facilitated by dip 
armament. 
45. In the under-developed countries, the magnitude of the edu- 
cational problem may be seen from the fact that most of them still have 
illiteracy rates of we11 over 50 per cent of the population aged fifteen 
years and over. The cost of educational requirements in underdeveloped 
countries for education is exemplified by a recently adopted African 
programme.16 On the basis of inventories of educatmnal needs of the 
countries covered by the African plan17 the total cost of the programme 
is expected to increase from $590 million in the first year to $1,150 
million in 1965, $1,880 million in 1970 and $2,600 million in 1980. 
It is assumed that the share of national income devoted to e d u d o n  
win rise from 3 to 4 per cent between 1961 and 1965, and thereafter 
will increase further, reaching 6 per cent of national income by 1980. 
This means that the difference, amount in the same years to $140 
million, $450 millian, $1,010 million 3 $400 million, respectively, 
would need to be covered by foreign aid. 
46. Apart from needs in the fields of health and education, there 
are urgent requirements for expansion in s o d  sm'ces.  Even in the 
most advanced countries, there are pronounced shortcomings in F e  
provision of child welfare services, m t i o n d  rehabilitation agenu-, 
community centres and other special services. 
47. It is thus clear that, so far as socia1 investment is concerned, 
there is already a 11eavy backlog of urgent need, and the recent accelera- 
tion of population growth and of technical change make it certain that 
the need, and the demand, will grow. Social investment therefore is 
likely to claim an increasing volume of resources, to which disarmament 
would make a welcome contribution. 
48. The release of scientific and teehnial manpower would be one 
of the important consequences of disarmament. Amongst the major 
-Based on information in Report on the Prograinme, op. cit., p 66, and N. 
Khrushfiev's Report, op. tit., p. 122. 
UUnited Nations Eaonornic Commission* for Africa and Unit& Matiws 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organtiatton, O~tl ine of u Phm w A can 
Edrrarianol D I Y ~ I O P N I X ~  (UNESCOJEDJ180) : and Final R e b h  (CTNEKO, . . . .
ED/181). 
arThe plan covers only thirty-five States and territories of Africa It cxfludts, 
in particular, the countries hrdcring on the Mediterrantan and the Un~m of 
South Africa. 
powers a significant part of the national research and development effort 
currently serves military purposes. The total elimination of military 
spending would bring about a skble release of resources for civilian 
research and development. With disarmament it would thus become 
possible to enmurage programmes of h i c  scientific research in fields 
which have hitherto ken neglected, and to mobilize great scientific 
potential for the solution of some of the world's greatest problems in 
such areas as medicine, urban development and reorgamzation, and 
the technical problems associated with the economic development of 
under-developed countries. If human ingenuity, in the space of a very 
few ears, has so vastly increased man's powers for destruction, it r shw d be able to make an equally massive contribution to peaceful and 
constructive achievement. 
49. Not a11 of the needs described above can be satisfied by 
single nations acting alone. In some instances their aatkfdof l  will 
require international co-operation?s Seriws gaps exist in the prmanmt 
world-wide network of meteorological observing stations and in the 
ccrrresponding telecommunication facilities, and s marked increase is 
rquired in the funds available for basic research on irnprovin mete- 
orological services. Furthermare, the funds currently avaih % le for 
assisting meteorological development in the less developed countries are 
far less than needed to satisfy current demands, not to mention pros- 
pective demands. TeIecommunications are important to developing 
economies and there is need to pursue a number of objectives in this 
field, including the development of networks. There is also considerabIe 
scope for international co-operation in developing the world's air ttans- 
port facilities. 
50, Disarmament would also open up possibilities for joint inter- 
national ventures af an even more ambitious kind, including the utiliza- 
tion of atomic energy for peaceful putposes, space research, the explora- 
tion of the Arctic and Antarctic for the benefit of mankind and projects 
to than e the climates of Iarge areas of the world. Joint restarch into 
the eart!'s interior may lead to discoveries that would be of real value 
to the whole world. In addition, joint projects to assist the development 
of under-developed countries as well as programmes of co-operation 
in the social and economic fields could be undertaken. These inter- 
national projects could have a major impact on world living standards 
and civilrzation. 
52. It is evident from the foregoing illustrative discussion of the 
magnitude of current and impending needs that the resources freed by 
disarmament would not be large enough for the many claims upon them. 
Though it wouId take active decisions by Governments in the light of 
national and international needs to set in motion the necessary pro- 
grammes for employing the released resources, it seems abundantly clear 
that no country need fear a lack of useful employment opportunities 
for the resources that would become available to it through disarmament. 
For communications received £rom specialized agencies of the United Nations 
on matters discussed in these paragraphs, see volumt I1 of this report (V3593/ 
Rev,l/Add.l) . 
CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPACI' OF DIS- ON NATIONAL 
PRODUCTION AND EMPWYMENT 
52. Disarmament would raise both general problems of maintain- 
ing the over-all Ievd of economic activity and employment and specific 
problems in so far as manpower o r  productive capacity might require 
adaptation to non-military needs. Structural problems of conversion of 
the latter type will be discussed in chapter 4. Successful maintenance of 
the level of aggregate demand, production and employment would 
facilitate the solution of specific structural or frictional problems. Con- 
versely, economic policies which dealt smoothly and effectively with 
the structural or frictional problems wwld heIp to promote the solution 
of the general problems. In both cases, careful preparation would be 
required to ensure that the various stages of the disarmament proFess 
were accompanied by as little disturbance of economic life as possrbfe. 
53. In the economic life of all countries, shifts in the pattern of 
demand and in the allocation of productive resources are continually 
occurring in response to changes in technology, foreign trade, consumer 
tastes, per capita i n m e ,  the age distribution of the population, migra- 
tion, and many other factors. Some industries grow more rapidly than 
others, while the outp~it of certain industries may even decline in absolute 
terms. Such shifts involve a transfer of manpower and capital between 
occupations. industries and regions. The rdlocation of productive re- 
sources which would accompany disarmament is in many respects merely 
a special case of the phenomenon of economic growth. 
54. There are, however, some aspects of the process of disarma- 
ment which wotild raise probIems significantly different from those that 
have been experienced in the usual process of economic growth. While 
many of the continuous changes in the composition of demand work 
themselves out onIy over a long period of time, it seems reasonable 
to assume that disarmament, once degded ilpon, would occur more 
rapidly--over a period of only a few years. For some components of 
military demand, the whole of the shift mirrht occur within a very short 
period of time such as a single year. The reallocation of resources 
attendant upon disarmament would therefore pose some special problems. 
The more rapid the rate of growth of an economy, however, the easier 
it would be to bring about the economic changes disarmament might 
require. 
55, The conversion of resorlrces that would be required as a result 
of disarmament at the present time would be far smaller, in the ag- 
gregate. than that which took place at the end of the Second World 
War. Thus an examination of the early post-war conversion may help 
to give perspective to the present problem. The experience of the 
smaller-sale conversion that followed the end of the hostilities in Korea 
also deserves consideration. 
56. The post-war conversion was a much larger one and invol?ed 
a more rapid transfer of resources than total disarmament would r e q m  
at present. During the last years of the war, the world devoted about we 
half of its resources to destruction. The real milibry expenditure and 
the number of people in uniform were about four times as high as 
today. The extent of devastation in the areas ovenun by armies or 
bombed from the air was immense. The usual network of trade both 
within and between countries was thoroughty disrupted. Despite these 
difficulties, huge armies were quickly dernobrlized without a significant 
rise in unemployment in most countries, and the of mvery ,  
paiticularly of industrial output, was impressively raprd. 
57. During the post-war conversion, the major concern of e ~ +  
nomic policy was to restrain, rather than to maintain, over-all demand. 
This period was characterized by intense pressure of excess demand for 
lmth consumption and invesment. Most commodities were in short 
supply. Their distribution was carried out nearly everywhere with the 
aid of rationing; or at least under a system of price controls. The war- 
time acmmalation of liquid savings in the hands of the population 
guaranteed a high level of continued e%ective demand. As plant and 
equipment were released from war production and repaired or replaced, 
they were immediately turned to producing goods far which demand had 
remained unsatisfied or deferred in some countries durin nearly fifteen 5, years of the Great Depression and the war. Most of t e demobilized 
manpower found employment in civilian at~pations, while the total 
labour force declined, reflecting a voluntary withdrawal of some women, 
minors and veterans from the labour market. As supply conditions 
improved, price and distribution controls were progressively eased 
58. There were large arrears not only of consumption but dso 
of investment. The capital stock had in many countries been run dawn 
by destruction, obso?escence and lack of maintenance. Technological 
profless had continued and in fact sharply accelerated in some fields 
during the war years. But much of it had remained unincorporated in 
plant and equipment--during the depression because of lack of effective 
demand, and during the war because of diversion of resources to war- 
time needs. Residential construction had undergone successive post- 
ponement in same countries. These factors led to an upsurce in business 
and residential investment after the war, financed in part by the ac- 
cumulated liquid resources of corporations and of consumers and in 
part by various forms of public assistance. 
59. In tho United States, by the end of the Second World War, 
the military budget had accounted for over 40 per cent of the gross 
national prodact. Between I945 and 1946, expenditure on national 
security was reduced by 80 per cent. The decline m military expenditure 
was equal to one-third of the gross national product and nearly two- 
thirds of ersonaf consumption in 1944. By way of comparison it may 
be said t & t the military budget in the United States in recent years 
has been somewhat less than 10 per cent of the gross national product 
and about 15 per cent of personal consumption. 
60. The decline in total real demand was less than half the drop 
in military spend in^ because of the advance in all other sectors of 
demand. The small decline in national output was perhaps no more than 
could have been expected as a result of voluntary withdrawals from the 
labour force and from the shortening of working hours. 
61. The sharpest increase took place in gross Pr;vate domestic 
investment which rose from $21 billion to $51 billion--or from less 
than 6 per cent of gross national product to about 15 per cent. The rise 
in consumption also contributed in absolute terms nearly as much as 
investment, although its relative contribution was not so large. There 
were also increases in public expenditure for civilian purposes and h 
net foreign investment. Assistance f hrough UNRR A, other grants and 
credits to various countries for relief and xehabilitation helped toward 
a substantid expansion of United States exports. Thus the economy 
showed a high degree of flexibility even in the reIatively short run. 
62. Between August 1945 and June 1946, the size of the United 
States armed forces was reduced by over 9 mi1Iian men. There was a 
small reduction in the labour force as women and minors returned to 
home and school, and veterans continued their interrupted dueation. 
As a result of this, and of the cutting back of overtime, unemployment 
in 1946 remained below 4 per cent of the labour force, despite the very 
extensive and rapid demobilization. 
63. While the large backlog of demand of private business and con- 
sumers was responsible for much of the ease with which the post-war 
adjustment was made, effective government policies also helped. Taxes 
were reduced. There was a very great increase in transfer payments, 
principally veterans' cash benefits and payments related to the veterans' 
training and dueation programme. As a result, despite the massive 
decline in military spending, disposable income fell hardly at all. As 
regards investment, a large veterans' loan programme helped to finance 
the purchase of homes and farms, quick settlements were made to 
business on termination of war contracts, and an easy credit policy was 
maintained. The Government of the United States of America notes that: 
''Tried tmasures such as these would be under sctive consideration again 
in the event of the acceptance of a disarmament progmm!" 
64. In etrgsfem Europe the conversion process took somewhat 
longer than in the United States because of the damage or destruction 
to productive facilities and the fact that the total output had in many 
cases fa1Im below pre-war Iwels. Inflationary pressures were severe. 
Confidence in currencies was shaken. Man key products, notably coal, 
steel, certain imported materials, and foo d' stuffs were in short supply. 
65. Despite these difficulties the conversion was relatively rapid. 
Eighteen months after the cessation of hostilities, industrial output had 
recovered its pre-war level nearly everywhere except in the Federal 
Republic of Germany and in Italy. The demobilized armed forces were 
' SK tbe reply of the Governmeat of the United States of Amaica 
rather quickly absorbed in ernplopent in civilian occupations. Except 
in the two countries just mentioned, unempIoymenf declined well below 
pre-war levels. The recovery of western Europe was assisted by a con- 
siderable amqunt of external aid. 
66. In the United Kingdom, it is estimated that at the end of 
the war, 9 million persons, or 42 per cent of the total working pop&- 
tion, were either in the armed forces or engaged in the manufacture 
of equipment and supplies for them. Sixteen months later, the W 
number in these two categories had fallen by almost 7 7 0 n .  Of this 
total about 1.2 W o n  corresponded to a voluntary decline in the hbaur 
force, while involuntary unemployment rose by about 0.7 million. Thus 
over 5 million people were absorbed into civiliaa em loyment in the 
short s ce of sixteen months, whereas the cornpond& number that 
would Eve  to be absorbed in the event of disarmament m w  is just 
over 1 million. It is noteworthy that the number unemployed at any one 
time never greatly exceeded six or seven weeks' release at the maxirnm 
rate reached, and that it stood at this level only so long as r e l w  
continued at a substantial rate. Even so, unmpIoyment remained below 
4 per cent of the labour force. 
67. In some of the undm-developed corcn~es, the post-war re- 
covery resented spacial problems. This was partly because agriculture, 
which !' omed a much Iarger proportion of the output of the under- 
devebpd than of the developed countries, was g e n W  slower to IY recover than was industry. The long years of war bad ed in many 
cases to heavy exhaustion of farms and livestock and to disturbance of 
trading patterns. There was a world shortage of fertilizers, and recovery 
was also delayed in many M b-use initially inadequate industrial, 
transport and mining equipment had been strained beyond its rated 
capacity during the war. For some time after the war, too, delivery of 
equipment was delayed by conversion and re-equipment needs ia the 
industrial countries. 
68. There is, however, no reason to believe that any future dis- 
armament wouId be attended, in the under-developxi countries, by the 
same types of problem as prevailed after the Second World War. As 
indicated previously, the main question in these countria would be 
whether development programmes could be enlarged and stepped up 
"P cantly--and in sufficiently good tim+to permit the absorption o the demobilized armed forces and other resources into productive 
employment. 
69. In the Soviet Union, experience of conversion immediately 
following the Second World War was signifiantly different fiom that 
in other countries, because of the much greater destruction and devasta- 
tion which had taken place during the war. Much equipment had ken 
damaged or was in a bad state of repair. Plant and yu~pment constructed 
during the war had been designed entirely for military purposes, and 
was therefore somewhat less "convertible" than facilities constructed in 
peace-time. Superimposed on all this was the problem of transferring 
workers in the eastern territories-who had been evacuated from areas 
occupied by the Germans-back to their home districts in the western 
part of the country. For all these reasons there was a decline in industrial 
production from 1945 to 1946, concentrated in the producer gwds 
sector. Since some manpower had to be employed in tasks for which it 
was untrained there was a decline in output per man. These develop 
ments, however, were the result of the devastation and distoation 
referred to above. The subsequent recovery was very rapid and 1948 
industrid production was already nearly oneafth above the l&level. 
The circumstances of any future disarmament would be much more 
favourable to a smooth conversion process than those at the end of the 
Second World War. 
70. In other eartern Euro$ean counties the conversion procw~ 
had also to overcame heavy human and materid losses caused by the 
Second World War. In Pohnd alone, over 6 million people perished 
during the war and Nazi ocmpaticm. The respective Governments had 
to face the great damage caused to productive capacity, transport and 
housing, apart from dislocation of rnlations, monetary disturbances 
and other difficulties. Recovery was facilitated by the planned diredon 
of the process of reconstruction and readjustment which was made 
possible by the gradual nationalization of banking, of most industry 
and of transportation. The recovery proceeded relatively quickly, so that 
in 1948 in most countries the pre-war level of production was surpassed. 
C o m s x o ~  prsar THE KOREAN WAI~ 
71. In the United States at the end of the Korean hostilities many 
of the special features associated with demobilization after the Second 
World War were no longer present. Military s ~ d i n  fell from $62 
billion (in 1960 prices) in 1953 to $51 billion m 195 f , This was ac- 
companied by a liquidation of inventories that in part was associated 
directly with the fall in military expenditure itself, and in part reflected 
some business uncertainty regarding the immediate outlook for demand. 
The total decline in the national product, however, was less than half 
the reduction in miIitary spending, largely because of increases in con- 
sumption and domestic investment. The latter, in turn, were made 
possible by a reduction in taxes and a policy of monetary ease which 
was particularly important in stimulating expenditure on housing. Un- 
employment, after rising to 5.6 per cent of the labour force in 1954, 
defined to less than 4.4 per cent in 1955 in the h e  of further cutbacks 
in milikry spending. 
72. Characterizing the eflflectiveness of policies during this period, 
the Government of the United States of America observes that: 
"Despite the mildness of the 1954 recession it now is clear that f i d  
and monetary policies might have been applied with more oigor. The reaaon 
they were not is that the decline in ddence spending following the Korean 
War was not treated by the policy makers as a major demobilization requiring 
strong compeasatory a c h  For this reason the 1953-1954 period does not 
provide a significant guide to the behavior of the American economy in a 
disarmament program during the 196[rs!* 
73. In other countries, for which information is available, the 
degree of involvement in the Korean war was not such that its end 
provided experience of comparable relevance for the purpose of this 
study. With the cessation of hostilities in Korea, however, there was 
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I a diminution of international tensions which brought about reductions 
in military expenditure and releases from armed forces in various 
countries. No significant problems of reabsorption of the demobilized 
personnel arose in these countries. 
' 74 The experience of the centrally planned economies in reducing 
the armed forces is also of interest. In the Soviet Union, the armed 
forces were reduced from 5.8 miliion men in 1955 to 3.6 million men 
in 1958.8 There were also reductions in rnilitaq forces in other centrally 
pIanned economies during that period. No s~gnificant problems were 
created by the demobilization in these countties since the demand f?r 
1 labour was continually increasing. Discharged &ars were absorbed III 
I administrative posts in industry or agriculture and were pmvided with 
opportunities for retrainig at government expense. In a number of 
countries in eastern Europe, expansion in output of durable consumer 
ds was greatly facilitated after 1954 by utilizing the equipment which & earlier been devoted to producing armaments. 
75, National experience with general economic policies during 
previous conversion periods will unquestionably be valuable for policy 
d e r s  in the future. In adopting a programme of general and com- 
plete disarmament, Governments would certainly wish to assess very 
carefully the probable impact of disarmament on national production 
and employment, and to examine their economic policies to ensure that 
these were as well thought out as possible. It would be important to 
maintain a high general level of domestic demand for goods and services 
and thereby to support satisfactory levels of output and employment. 
This is already a well-established objective of national @icy, but it 
would have additional urgency both during the conversion period and 
also in the long run, after generat and complete disarmament had been 
achieved. 
76. The economic measures needed to maintain over-all effective 
demand are different in the p r i ~ t e  enterprise economies from those 
in the centrally planned economies. In the latter, economic decision- 
making is centralized. Most of the productive capacity is government- 
owned. The national economic plans are directed toward the achieve- 
ment of a set rate of growth and higher levels of living. In the private 
enterprise economies, on the other hand, where the private sectors are 
much larger than the government sectors, the power to make economic 
decisions is diffused. Governments must therefore rely heavily, in 
influencing economic decision-making in the private consumption and 
investment sectors, on relatively indirect means such as fiscal and 
monetary policies. In generat, the governments of under-developed 
countries cannot count as readily as those of the more developed m n -  
tries on an expansion of private investment. Greater attention needs 
*Then &a a govtnrmmt decision for a further d d o n  to 2.4 million men 
in 1960. Statement by PPtne Minister h h c h e v  reported in Pr- 15 ]annary 
1960. , . 
therefore to be given to undertaking whatever volume of expenditure 
may prove neces.sary in the governmentmed sector in the under- 
developed countmes. 
77. Much attention has already been given in the iltdussriafked 
privuk enterwe ecosomks to the methods by which total effective 
demand a n  be maintained. Member countries are pledged under the 
United Nations Charter to maintain full employment. A number of 
Governments have further undertaken in national statements of policy 
to adopt measures toward that objective, The instruments available 
for the prevention of any substantial shortfall of demand are well 
known. Their relative merits, however, vary widely from one country 
to another and from one time to another because of diffexences in 
institutions and attitudes. 
78. The nature and magnitude of the task of maintaining total 
demand at an adequate level to assure the ftrllest possible employment 
would depend to some extent upon the purpose to which the resources 
released from military use were applied. In some cases, it might be 
decided to use the released resourws by reducing taxes on income, 
particularly of lower income groups. In others, it might be decided to 
reduce the burden of indirect taxes on mass consumption goods borne 
mainIy by the lower income groups in the carnmunity, It might, also, 
be seen fit to adopt fiscal measures designed to stimulate investment 
expenditure. Tn yet other cases importance might be attached to reduc- 
tion of the public debt. Alternatively, a decision might also be taken 
to replace military expenditure by other kinds of government ex- 
penditure. These digwent policies would have different impacts upon 
the level of effective demand. In practice, different combinations of 
them would be IikeIy to be used in different countries. 
79. Disarmament would lead to an inmediate reduction of effective 
demand only in so far as total expenditure of the government-owned 
sector were reduced. It might seem at first sight that this resuIt would 
be avoided if tax revenue were reduced by the same amount as govern- 
ment expenditure, but this is not, in general, the case, since some of the 
increased disposabte income would be saved rather than spent. The 
effect on consumption would depend on which type of tax were reduced, 
whether direct or indirect, and on which income poup were affected. 
Generally, reduction in taxes diminishing the burdens on low income 
p u p s  are the most effective. Even so, however, some fall in income 
would result under these assumptions. A setback of this kind, unless 
counteracted by other measures, might also discourage private invest- 
ment and thus lead to a further fall in income. 
80. It should, perhaps, be observed that in so far as it is desired 
to raise private consumption, the appropriate means cannot lie ex- 
clusively in reductions in direct iaxation because those benefited by 
such a measure do not include the poorest sectors of the population whose 
incomes are too low to be taxed. Supplementary measures of various 
types would be required to ensure that all prts of the communi 
possible by disarmament. 
a benefited to some extent from the higher consumption levels ma e
81. The effect of using the money saved by a reduction of military 
acpenditure for repaying public debt would be twofold. On the one 
hand government expenditure on gmds and services would be lower, 
since debt rqm ent does not in itself constitute a direct offset to the 
reduction in mi& spending. On the other hand, by substituting hold- 
ings of money for ho dings of public debt some private spendmg on 
goads and services would probably be stimulated. The extent of this 
stimulation is difficult to assess, and would vary with the kind of debt 
redeemed, but it would be unlikely to offset the deflationary impact of 
the original reduction in government expenditure. 
82. Monetary and fiscai policy could be used to offset the &ect 
of a shortfall in total demand that might result from a decline in gov- 
ernment expenditure. Monetary policy, whether operated mainly through 
interest rates or mainly through a more direct control of credit, @yes 
some sco for the encouragement of both capital formation by business 
and purckes of durable goods by consumers. Changes in taxation, or 
transfers, in addition to their immediate effects on purchasing power, 
to which some reference has already been made, may a h  be expected 
to exert some influence on the formation of business capital; t a x  con- 
cessions may be designed to encouyge private investment in 
or to give special encouragement to investment in particular in fend ustxies 
or localities where it will most effectively employ resources former1y 
in military use. Moreover, although in some countries there are severe 
limits to the extent to which it is practiwble to use unbalanced budgets 
as a means of adjusting the level of dective demand, such measures, 
where they are acceptable, are powerful instruments for this purpose. 
Tax revenue might be deliberately reduced by more than the nd 
reduction in government expenditure brought about by disarmament. 
In some countries, the changes that have already taken place in the 
net budget balance of the government sector within small numbers of 
years appear to have been of the same order of magnitude as those that 
might be required to offset a shortfall of demand consequent upon 
disarmament. 
83. If a shortfall of effective demand m n o t  be fully dealt with 
by the foregoin methods, there always remains the possibility of an 
increase in civifan government expenditure designed at least in part 
to help in solving this problem. Expenditure on goods and services is, 
in general, likely to be more effecbve for this purpose than transfer 
e x p e n d h e t h e  increase of grants and subsidies to various sections 
of the community-but in the not unlikely event of the recipients being 
disposed to spend marly all the a s h  benefits they receive, the difie- 
would be small. 
84. The instruments of adjustment @erred to above are more 
highly developed, easier to bring into operation, and may be expected to 
work more effectively in some countries tban in others. Bearing ia 
mind, however, that a substantial part of military expenditure would 
probably be r laced by other overnment expenditure in most countries, 3 f it may be con uded from the oregoing paragraphs that the maintenance 
of effective demand in the face of disarmament should not prove di3icuft. 
Indeed, it should be practicable not merely to maintain the level of 
demand during the transition period, but to move f o m d  to the more 
rapid growth in total real income that a transfer of resources from 
military use to productive invesbnent would render physidy po~&le. 
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85. It has been argued that in so far as disarmament might lead 
to a reduction in the relative size of the governeat sector, the s t d d k h g  
effect that the existence of a substantial public sector exercises upon 
the general level of activity might be diminished. Military expenditure, 
however, has itself been notoriously subject to variations wbsch, 
unconnected with the requirements of stabilization policy, have distur % 
the level of activity in the economies in question and in the world as a 
whole. Disarmament need not therefore increase the d i d  of eco- 
nomic stabilization, even if it should lead to a fall in the r tive size 
of the government sector. 
2 
a. For many under-develojed cou~trks,  the effect of d i -  
ment upon the industrial countries' demands for primary products, and 
thus on the export earnings of the primary producing countries, would 
be of great importance. So would the methods of dealing with the 
Iiquidation of strategic stockpiles. These problems are &sassed in 
chapter 5. It is necessary to add here that the industrial countries' suc- 
m s  in mainkinin effective demand during the immediate period of d disarmament wouI be of great concern to all primary producing coun- 
tries. The significance of disarmament for an expamion of aid to under- 
deveIoped countries is dealt with in chapter 6. 
87. The effects of disarmament within the underdweloped coua- 
tries themselves would vary from one to another. In some cases, the 
ratio of the military budget to the gross domestic product is of the 
same order of magnitude as in the major military powers (4-10 
I 
cent). In the majority of cases (including most of the larger un 8" er- 
developed countries), it is less than 4 per cent. So far as growth mtes 
are concerned, however, the effects of the release for non-milita?; 
purposes of these proportions of the national resources, whether I 
or low, might be greater than the figures would by themselves suggest. I 
Both total capital formation and government expenditure are generally 
smaller in relation to gross domestic product in the under-developed 
countries than in the richer ones. The ratio of military e n d i m r e  
to gross domestic capital formation in the majority of under-developed q 
countries for which the data exist lies in the same range I0 per cent 
and upward) as in the majority of other countries. Thus 8 e contribu- 
tion of disarmament to their economic growth would be very substantial. 
88. Underdeveloped countries usually obtain their supplies of 
munitions from abroad either as direct purchases or as grants under 
military agreements ot bath. To the extent that these imports are 
received without payment, their cessation would have little economic 
impact on under-developed countries. On the other hand, to the extent 
that these imports have required the expenditure of foreign exchange, 
disarmament would make it possible to reallocate foreign exchange 
to imports of capital goods and of other equipment needed for economic 
growth. There are, however, a few countries which have been receiving 
considerable foreign exclxmge from foreign military aid and milImy 
expenditure including the outlays of foreign personnel. In consequwce, 
it is important that any disarmament programme should include meas- 
ures to relieve the strain on the external balances of such countries. 
89. Reductions in the military budgets of most underdeveloped 
wuntries would have their main effects through the reduction of man- 
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power in the armed forces and the assodated decrease in Id ex- 
penditure on the products used by the armed forces. The release of 
unskilled military personnel would to some extent aggravate the already 
difficult problems of unemployment and under+inpbyment. On the 
other hand, the members of the armed forces in the under-developed 
countries are frequently tetter provided with potentially useful skills 
than the rest of the population. The more skilled men should be easier 
to absorb into productive employment and their absorption should con- 
tribute substantially to the development of the economy. 
90. As was pointed out above with respect to the industrialized 
private enterprise economies, the maintenance of the level of efiective 
demand may require sustain~ng the level of governmmt expenditure. 
This consideration appears to apply with greater force to the under- 
developed countries, where tax reduction may be less effective in 
stimulating private expenditure than it is in the more developed econ- 
omies. The need to plan alternative government expenditure would 
therefore be particularly great. 
91. In the cerrtrally plumed bcosomies, the maintenance of ef- 
fective demand while reducing military expenditure would be simply 
a matter of efficiency of planning techniques. Since decisions cancerntng 
the production of military output as well as *of investment and con- 
sumer goods are co-ordinated through the nat~onal economic plan, the 
substitution of one type of expenditure for another does not raise any 
basic problems for the maintenance of effective demand. The reply 
from the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic indicates 
that this can be accomplished by certain adjustments in the current 
economic plans without necessitating the establishment of any special 
economic institutions. The effect of the decline in armaments expenditure 
could be largely offset b corresponding increases in investment in ? plant and equipment and or other purposes such as housing as well as 
by increases in personal consumption. A rise in personal consumption 
could be brought about by a reduction in taxatron corresponding in 
magnitude to that part of armament expenditure which was not replaced 
by investment. 
92. In consequence, effective demand could be readily main- 
tained, and the principal problems of conversion would concern the 
physical adaptatian of plants producing armaments to the produetion of 
goods for civilian use. The problems of reallocation of resources are 
discussed in some detail in the reply from the Government of the Polish 
People's Republic.' It is indicated that the period of short-term transi- 
tion may be divided into three major stages. In the first stage, the 
main concern would be to utilize the existing military fmed assets and 
skilled manpower for facilitating an increase in the output of civilian 
goods and services. The role of new investment and development of 
additional supplies of raw materials would be reIatively minor. It is 
suggested that the warehouses, transport and communications equipment, 
repair shops and other capital equipment and raw materials used for 
military purposes would be converted as far as technical1 possible to 
the production of civilian goods. Military personnel wit K specialized 
*See the reply of tht Government of the Polish People's Rcpnblic. 
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lugher education would be transferred to civilian functions in the w- 
mmts of health, education and d a l  services. 
93. The second stage involves an ex ion of plant and equip- 
ment, in which there is relatively i t n i t s  no excess upcity  at 
resent, for the absorption of the manpower released from mihtary use. 
L c u l a r  attention would have to be paid to overcoming the shortages 
of raw materials that might develop. For this urpose, an increase in the 
domestic output of there commod~tier as welfas in =ports to p y  for 
imports would be called for. With an adequate expansion of productive 
capacities and of the raw materials base, it would then be possible in 
the third stage to reap the full benefits of conversion-in the form of 
a higher rate of growth of the economy and of levels of living than is 
currently envisaged. 
CHAPTER 4 
STRUCTURAt PROBLEMS OF CONVJ3RSION 
94. Even with the successful maintenance of total effective demand 
during a period of disarmament, significant problems of adjustment 
would remain in specific sectors and areas of the economy. Part of the 
personnel released by the armed forces and the armaments industry 
would have to be trained or retrained so as to permit absorption into 
peacetime occupations. Some plant and equipment would have to be 
converted. Productive apacity might contract in some industries, and 
might have to be expanded in others. Where the manufacture of 
armaments has been concentrated in particular regions, it would be 
necessary either to shift resources out of those regions to other areas 
of growng demand, or alternatively to undertake schemes of redevehp 
m a t .  The necessary steps w d d  have to be taken to modify the diredm 
of research and of technological development. 
95. It has alrady been suggested that the broad roblem of re- 
adaptation of industry and manpower resulting from &armament is 
not basically dissimilar from that experienced in the normai process 
of economic growth. For example, a decline in demand for coal in 
western Europe and North America has created special problam in 
the d mining communitia. The position in some of the textile towns 
is similar. In the centrally planned economies, problems of this type 
can be handled by planning. In private enterprise economies, where 
adjustments may be delayed because of such dramstanm as im- 
mobility of some labour or capital and rigidity of prices, they can be 
dealt with by special government rnmrts. 
96. The higher the rate of growth of the economy, the easier the 
p m s s  of adaptation. I n  the longer run, disarmament would allow 
each country to raise the rate of investment and to adapt productive 
mpacity more adequately to the needs of the population and to the 
requirements of economic growth, both in the pvate enterprise and the 
centrally planned economies. 
97. In the shorter run, the smoothness of the transition would 
largely depend on the ability of Governments to anticipate the types 
of problem that might arise, and on the adequacy of preprations, This 
calls for an adequate assessment of the direct and indirect demands of 
military expenditure on each industrial sector and region, and of the 
extent to which a replacement of military by other expenditure would 
involve a modification of the structure of demand. Such a confrwtation 
of milita demands and of civilian alternatives mn be wried out in 7 detail on y by national Governments. The present discussion sets out 
only some of the more important considerations involved. 
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98. The resources now supplying military requireme- could bc 
adapted to peacetime needs partly by shifts within industries and plants, 
and partIy by shifts between industries. 
(a) Shifts within i~dust&s & pbnts. In a large number of 
cases, it may be pssible for a given plant to shift the nature of the 
end-product from military quipment to durable consumer goods and 
investment p d s  while usin4 the same productive equipment and man- 
power. For ~nstance, there mlght be a shift from tanks ta tractors, from 
military to civilian aircraft, from naval vessds to merchant ships, or 
from electronic equipment for military purpses to television sets. This 
might be a relatively easy procedure, in many cases involving little more 
than changes in designs, retooling, and minor adaptations of skills, 
particularly in plants and enterprises which already produce both 
military and civilian goods. 
(b) S h i s  b&em hd*s. Other cases, however, might d l  
for a more complex form of conversion requiring the output of some 
industries to be completely stopped or sharply curtailed and that of 
others to be correspondingly expanded. Many ordnance factories might 
cease to produce altogether. In same countries, the total output of 
airmft, ships and boats would have to be reduced sin= civilian 
demand far such products would not fully oftset the fall in military 
d-d. On the other hand, a considerable expansion of output in the 
cement, brick, glass and building industries might be reqdred should 
there be a shift in expenditure in favour of civilian construction. Shifts 
of this trpe cannot be accommodated within the same plant but require 
instead a movement of resources from one industry to another. 
99. Shifts between industiies w d d  necessitate acquisition of 
different types of ski11 bv the working force as well as new investment in 
plant and equipment. They would take a somewhat langer time to 
accompIish than shifts within industries, the lenp$h of time depending 
on how mjor or far-removed were the shifts. If the two industries were 
to have a similar resource content--as do the aircraft industry and the 
pneral engineering industry, for insianc-he adaptation would be 
easier and would &ke a shorter time than if the two industries were to 
differ simifitantly in resource content-as do the aircraft indusw and 
the buitding materials industry, for example. The extent to which the 
conversion would involve shifts within industries and plants as apposed 
to Bifts betweerr industries can be judged from studies made in a 
nt~rnber of countries. 
THE PROBLEM OF INTER-IMPUSTRY SHXFTS 
100. In the United Statss, owing to t h ~  mneentratioh of military 
apenditure in a limited number of mdustnes, only a few industries 
would be aEected sharply by reductions in military demand. Professor 
Leontief has prepared a hypothetical study of the inter-industrial ram%- 
ations of conversion in the United States on tho assumption that 
military expenditure is replaced wboIly by inmasa in expenditure on 
other Idnds of ods and services m proportion to their shares in total 
demand in 195fl Such a reallootion of military qenditure would 
W. -ti$ and Y. H&&rg, "The Economic Ed- of Disarmamtnt", 
S&ed& A m o n  (New York), v d  204, NO. 4, Apd 1961, pp. 4735. 
release 1,320,000 em loyees from the contractky industries for tm- 
loyment elsewhere. 8 ver four-fifths of the decline m loyment would & in four industri-ircraft and (which hc ""P udes missiles), 
radio, ordnance, and ships and boats g a n n a  3, table 3-11. Employ- 
ment would be totally eliminated in the ordnance industry and would 
fall by more than 90 per cent in the aircraft and prts industry; ex- 
pansion of demand for civilian aircraft would have only a minor in- 
I fluence cn output in the latter industry. 
101. In addition to the 1,32l,000 employees released from con- 
tracting industries, the 2,530,000 members of the armed fotcw and 
about 790,000 civilian employees of military agenda would b e  
available for alternative employment. n u s ,  about 4.5 million persons 
.-some 6 or 7 per cent of the total labour force in employment xn 1958 
I -wouldy on these assumptions, have to change their emplopmmt from 
one industry group to another or find civilian instead of military em- 
ployment. 
102. Professor h n t i e f  estimates the number absorbed into ex- 
panding sectors to be some 600,000 less than that released from the 
I military establishment and the contracting industries. This difference, 
taken literally, would h p l y  that an increase of about 1 per cent in t d  
government and private expenditure, spread over tbe duration of ~ 
disarmament process, would be required to preserve the traf l e d  
of employment. It is, however, a residual figure which shou r d be treated 
with reserve, since it is less than the margin of error of this hypotheticat 
caIculation. 
103. A similar calculation, though with less narrow1 defined in- 
dustry groups, has been made far the United Kirtgdom { y Professor 
J. R. N. Stone and his colleagues of the University of Cambridge, De- 
partment of Applied Economics. The assumption in this case is that 
military expenditure is replaced as to one-third by iflaeased private 
consumption expenditure, one-third by fixed capital formation at home, 
and one-third by increased foreign aid. The only industrial g m p  in 
.which output (and hence employment) is estimated to decline is that 
including the manufacture of ships and aircraft, in which the fail is 
about 20 per cent (see annex 3. table 3-2). Including the members of 
the armed forces themselves, and civilian employees of the military es- 
tablishment, the number of persons r e q u i d  to change their "industry 
group" would be about 9W000, or between 3% and 4 per cent of the 
labour force. 
104. In both cases, these mlculations indicate the numbers who 
wodd have to move from one industry to another (or out of direct 
military employment) in the went of wry rapid disarmament. If the ' operation were to extend over a number of years, the change per 
annum would be only a fraction of the total. Moreover, a substantial 
proportion of the shrinkage in the armed forces and in the contracting 
industries might take place through the normal process of turnover, 
thereby diminishing the number of persons actually required to move 
from one kind of employment to another. 
105. T h e  replies received from a number of 0 t h  cousfrrfrr~s of 
wesfem Esrrops indicate that the problem of shifts from one industry 
- 
to another would be a relatively srnalI one? According to these replies, 
the rate of economic growth is now S i t ed  by labour shortages and it 
could be accelerated if manpwer were released from military uses. 
f 06. Under-dmloped cou~ltries generaIly have been meeting their 
requirements for military goods and services by imports, so that their 
disarmament would release foreign exchange rather than industrial 
workers. As indicated in chapter 3, it would also free members of the 
forces with many useful skills and training. Some of these would be 
absorkd by the growing labour market; others could be usefully em- 
ployed in the development of social capital by construction of minor 
~rrigation works, feeder-roads and other community development pro j- 
ects, which would help to mitigate the already acute problem of under- 
development. 
107. In some of the sepni-industPioEked cov~tr ies ,  however, the 
newly started basic industries which manufacture, for example, chemid 
fertilizers, heavy machine tools, heavy vehicles, aircraft and electronic 
equipment, have been serving both military and civilian needs. In the 
event of disarmament these industries could concentrate, without any 
transitional difficulty, on the manufacture of capital goods so urgently 
needed for both consumer goods industries and capital goods industries. 
Transport eapacity, particularly vehicles, released fmm military uses, 
would stlppIement the inadequate transport facilities available in the 
present stage of their development. 
108. In the central!y planmed eronomks, as indicated previously, 
productive capacity is usually fully utilized. Thus it would be necessary 
to convert plants producing military equipment to production of durable 
consumer goods and of such investment goods as can be produced 
in them with only minor retooling. Such conversion could be achieved 
rapidly. Many plants producing military equipment produce also certain 
goods for civiIian purposes. In Poland, for instance, pIants which manu- 
facture military equipment also account for about SO per cent of the 
national output of motor cycles and scooters, 80 per cent of the sewing 
machines. 70 pet cent of the washing machines and 30 per cent of the 
refrigerators produced in the country.= The reply of the Government 
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic mentions experience with con- 
version of a number of plants from miHtary production to production 
of medium-sized trucks, tractors and television sets, in d l  of which no 
more than 3 to 4 per cent of the productive equipment was found to 
be unutilizable after con~ersion.~ 
109. In the longer run, disarmament would make possible sub- 
stantial increases of investment, so that the more adequate adaptation 
of productive capacity to the needs of the population and to the r uire- 
ments of eeonornie growth muld proceed fairly rapidly. In ~ o k 8 .  for 
instance, it is estimated that total disarmament would allow the total 
amount of capital investment to rise by over 9 per cent a s  compared 
with the level of 1%2P In Bulgaria an increase of investment by I0 
Set volume If of this report (E/3593/Rev.l/Add.l). 
*a the reply of the Government of the Polish Peo le's Republic 
the of the h e m m a t  ~ l e  czFchostoMe Socidiat ~epubr*. 
'See the reply of the Governmat of the Pohsh People's &public, Addtndmn. 
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to 12 per cent would be possible in consequence of dhmamtnt.6 A 
considerable increase in investment would also take place in Hungary? 
110. The replies of the Governments of the centrally planned 
economies state that there will be no djf6culty in absorbing r e l d  
manpower. In countries such as Czechoslovakia, the German Demwmtic 
Republic and Hungary, the supply of labour in recmt ~s has not 
kept pace with growing labour requirements. In P o h d  ~t is estimated 
that in the next few years the increase of the industrial l a b  f o r e  
will be drawn mainly from the natural i r ~ m  of the urban population 
with relatively little influx of workers from agriculture to industry. In 
these circumstances it would appear that demobilization of man wer 
might slow down the transfer of labour from agriculture to in cr ustry. 
But the increase of investment following disarmament would raise con- 
siderably the requirement of labour for industry and e ~ ~ ~ .  The 
final effect, therefore, would be to stimulate rather than to slow down 
the transfer of labour from agriculture to industry. In the Soviet 
Union the absorption of demobiked personnel would be gratly fadli- 
tated by the growing demand for manpower in the rapidly -ding 
eastern territories. The construction of new industrial centres and the 
expansion of cultivation of l u ~ d  in the less populated A s i a n p  of the 
Soviet Union, particularly in Siberia, has generated a emand for 
labour which cannot be fully met by local resources. Migration to these 
territories is being encouraged and dhmamnt w d d  prwide a 
welcome source for addition to the manpower required. 
111. The precedin anaIysis of the changes resulting from the 7 prmess of reallocation o military expenditure to other urposes su 
gests ttnt the net rhihs in employment  am^ output mu1 I b~ relativeki 
and.  As already indicated, however, special problems would arise 
from a concentration of the military effort in certain industries or areas. 
L These problems may be broadly classified as follows: 
(i)  Adaptation of skills to peace-time requirements. 
(ii) Problems of assistance to particular enterprises, industries 
and localities, heavily oriented to military use. 
(iii) Reorientation of research and techndogicaI development. 
(i) Adapt& of $Kills 
112. In some instances, the skills that are essential for d c e  
I 
in the armed forces or in some of the major industries praduciug 
military p o d s  may not be readily adaptable to the requirements of 
civilian employment. Consequently, there would arise a n q  to 
revain part of tbe skilled manpower and to train some of the unskrlIad 
ll3. hd a) Amted pwsmnd a d  mpluy$es in the Mijeirby of Dgfmce. ost of the officers in modern armed forces have received 
'Sac the,reply of the People's R TMiC Of BulWir 'Aecordmg to the reply of the overnntent of the H ' Pm e's % 
public, military expaditwe in 1959 w u  25 thousand mih- W&C Wd 
invcgtment m 19.5 thousand million forints. If oaly half of tbe military ex- 
pmditure were turned to invtstment, the latter would Immaae by ahat& 6 5  pct ceat 
training that would fit them easily for techaid, engineering, medid 
and similar posts in civilian life. As the reply of the Guvemment of 
the United States of America indicates, 85 per cent of the commissioned 
offictrs in that country have corn leted gome form of college training. tR However, some of the senior o cers in the armed forces have been 
traiued for purposes significantly different from those that are needed 
in civilian life. A special effort would have to be made to find suitable 
q l o y m e n t  for them. Some of them might be d l e d  on to serve in 
mrlous =pacities in the international organs to be set up for control 
of disarmament. %me wouId find useful occupations in civilian activities 
where their organizational abilities may be a special requirement. Since 
the number of officers is usually not very large, it should not be hard 
to absorb them into civilian life. 
114. The demobilization of the non-prokssional members of the 
armed forces would involve a much larger number of persons. But 
most of these men have been drawn from civiIian life where they were 
prwiwsl~ engaged in non-military occupations. They are usually young 
and relauvely mobile. Military service has often interrupted their educa- 
tion. In many cases, however, they have acquired new technical skills 
while in military service. In most of the underdeveloped countries, the 
regular armed forces possess a much higher level of industrial and 
technical skilb than the civilian pulation; this would tend to 
them a relatively greater chance o r being absorbed into civilian emp oy- 
mcnt, particularly in an expnding economy. 
f= 
115. The release of the armed forces, over some years, wodd 
imply only that the number of new entrants for that M o d  wodd be 
augmented by this special factor. In some countries, particularly in 
Europe, which are faced with shortages of manpower, the availability 
of a larger labour force could indeed con~bute  to an acceleration of 
the rate of economic growth. Moreover, the financial resources r e l a d  
by di-ent should make it possible to arrange for &nation pay 
and special allow~nws for various types of training. For i-ce, the 
Government of the United States carried out, after the' Second World 
War, a lar e programme for education, training and job placement for 
demobiliz d army personnel. Nearly 8 million veterans took advantage 
of the training programme. Similar1 , 2 million, or one-third of the 
eIi@bIe veterans of the Korean war ave benefited from such training 
facilities! 
X 
116. The reply of the Government of the Polish People's Republic 
indicates the magnitudes involved in re-employing the non-professional 
members of the armed forces. It is anticipated that a majority of the 
draftees from rural areas would return to the countryside to help in 
the projected intensification of agriculture. Some 20 to 30 cent are 
expected to be employed in plants which now produce mi r= 'tary equip- 
mmt but m l d  immediately be converted to produce investment goods, 
-port commodities and raw materials. This would further facilitate the 
productive employment of the remainder. 
117. (b) Imdwtries prodacing military goods. As pointed out 
above, the problem of conversion in the industrial countriesB is likely . Sae the rcpv of the Government of the Unitcd States of Amtriea 
* Owing to nrtuaI absence of major qilitary er industries in the rmdcr- 
deoeloped countries, tbis qtwstiw h~ relaawb lnutcd relevance for than. 
I 
to be a short-term one for most industries. In industries de nd' 
h a i l  on m i l k y  orders, many of the employees possess a y eve1 ? o 
skill &at should find gainful employment in other branches of produe- 
tion,1° so long as over-all effective demand is ris' . Momvex, wbere 
some form of retraining or additional trai -f w?. 3 be needed for an- 
pl ment, it could be acquired through the acrllhes for apprenticeship 
an "B on-the-job training of ten provided by individual firms or plants for 
1 their new labour force. Even so, there might k some s ial cases 
which would require speciaI assistance to emowage the a r aptation of 
EMIS to new jobs. Such help couId be provided through opportunities 
for vocational training financed by such meam as termhation pay or 
other special measures. 
118. In this age of automation the demand for highly skilled 
labour is rising faster than the demand for semi-skilled and unskiUed 
Therefore a significant number of those who would be released in the 
latter categories might be faced with difficult problems, particularly 
if they were of an advanced age. While the experience of a much more 
extensive demobilization and conversion at the end of the Second 
World War suggests that the roblems thus arising are by no means 
insuperable, governments shou f d stand ready to assist the reabsorption 
of such workers into productive employment. 
& 
(ii) Particular ewtsrp&s and iocalitiss 
119. Owing to the concentration of military output in a few 
industries, termination of military contracts would bear specially upon 
the activities of particular enterprises. These would have a choice of 
three courses of action : complete shutdown, the adaptation of existing 
plant and equipment to the production of other p a d s  throu h major 
retooling, and investment in entirely new plants. Similar pro \ 1 m s  an 
a much larger scale were faced at the end of the last war and tackled 
with a considerable degree of success. 
120. The geographical distribution of the actiw based on 
military expenditure is very uneven in m y  urmtrks. &e +p- 
merits necessitated by disarmament woyld thefeforc impinge parhcu rly 
heavily on certain areas and l d t i e s .  Varlous forms of public and 
other mistance would thus prove necessary to facilitate readjustment. 
Measures of three types would be required. First, attempts shouId be 
made to diversify the strudre of employment by developing new 
industries where possible. Secondly, adequate relmtion allowances 
should be provided to facilitate the movement of those who are mobile to 
areas where the labour market is expanding. Thirdly, adquate relief 
should be granted to those whose attachment to the locality 1s too deep 
or whose age is too advanced to contemplate moving to other arms. 
The costs of the necessary measures would be very small in relation to 
the resources that disarmament would release. 
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(iii) Reo&nfah'on of rgsearch a d  tschnologicd d e w o l o ~ t  
121. In the centrally planned economies Governments have always 
played a major role in promoting research and development. In the 
private enterprise economies also, this role has expanded everywhere in 
recent years, particularly through the growth of research for military 
purposes. In the United Kingdom, direct military expenditure is 
responsible for nearly two-fifths of the total spent on research and 
developent. ApproximateIy half of the research and development 
effort m the United States is financed out of the military budget; this 
part of research is highly concentrated in a few industries. 
122. The magnitude of the task of shifting scientific and technid 
personnel to non-military fields of research would differ from country 
to country, but the estimates that have been made for the United States 
may have some relevance elsewhere. In that wuntr expenditure on 
research and development is six to seven times higter dollar af 
military demand than per dohr  of final civilian demand. Therefore, 
on the hypothetical assumption of an unchanged proportional allmation 
of fun& to science by the civilian sector, the reply of the Government 
of the United States of America estimates that a redomtion of total 
military expenditure to civilian purposes would lead to a reduction 
of about 40 per cent in spend~ng for research and development. The 
corresponding decline in the, employment of scientific personnel would 
amount to only half the decline in research and development spending, 
or about 20 per cenLIP 
123. No reduction in the actual employment of scientific and 
technical personnel need be feared! however, because the demand far 
civilian research would i n c r y e  rap~dly. Indeed, one of the main reasons 
why scientific research is st~ll far from adequately applied in many 
c i d i  fields is the fact that highly qualified personnel have been 
scarce, and have been pre-empted by military demands. A more ade uate 
supply of specialists would make it possible to o p n  u new fid%s of 
inquiry, hitherto virtually neglected, as well as to devote &, ger resources 
to existing lines of scientific investigation in both the develop& and 
underdeveloped countries. The scope for peaceful research in the 
physical, chemical, biological and human sciences is unfimited, a d  the 
potential benefits to the whole of humanity incalculable. 
See the reply of the GoPernment of the United Statcs of America. 
Tbe smaller decline in employment is,due +part to fact that the. material# 
and tquipmmt -tent of rcsparch expendlhlres is mueh.h@wr for milrmilrtary than 
for aviIian m c h  and in part to the fact that more scleutists and Wneers  arc 
required in posts not directly connected with reaearch and deveIopment in the 
noalnilitary industries than in the military. 
CHAPTER 5 
TEE IMPACT OF DISAmMMENT ON INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC REWI"I'0HS 
124. Disarmament would be bound to have favourable effects on 
the development of international economic relations. The politid 
dikn te that would accompany an international disarmament programme 
would in itself imply that nations were willing to reconsider their 
economic relations with one another. The consequent relaxation of 
international tensions would provide a sound h t s  for reduction ,of 
trade barriers and for modifimtion of existing trade agreements and 
trading practices. In the long run this would encourage an expansion of 
international trade, a more rational international division of labour and 
a more effective use of the world's resources. In the short term it might 
help conversion by enerating new demand for exports from existtng 
capacities. 
L sources of supply t t could be satisfied fairly easily from existing 
125. The relaxation of international tension would benefit trade 4 
through the elimination of the concern with national defence as a factor 
affecting national trade policies. The needs of national defence have long 
been accepted as a legitimate reason for the pursuit of discriminatory 
and protectionist po1icies.l Among the justifications advanced for the 
protection of agriculture and mining in many industrial countries has 
been the need to guarantee an adequate national supply af food and raw 
materials. In many instances, the domestic production of manufactured 
goods, as well, has been promoted on security grounds, to the detriment 
of international trade. Security is not the only consideration in such 
cases, and may not even be the decisive one; nevertheless, it carries 
considerable weight with Governments at the present time. After dis- 
armament, however, its force would be lost, and an opprtunit would 
be afforded to re-examine and improve the framework of word f trade, 
126. An important aspect of this matter is trade between the 
centrally planned economies and the rest of the world. Although this 
trade has been rising in relation to world trade in recent years, its 
share is still low in comparison with the levels prevailing before the 
Second World War and, especially, in comparison with the share of 
these economies in world output and with the levels that could be 
achieved under favourable conditions in the future. The centtaIly 
planned economies are expanding rapidly and form a growing market, 
particularly for durable producers' goods and raw materials. At the 
'It is true that at certain times national security considerations have led to 
higher trade flows in particular directions than might otherwise have taken place; 
strategic stockpiIing, for exampIe, hi stimulated purchases of some commodities. 
However, this stimulus has not been an unmixed bIessing, and in any stack- 
piling is no longer signi6cant in worfd trade. 
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same time, they are capable of serving as a source of supply to the 
rest of the world for certain primary products and manufactures. The 
obstales that stand in the way of cIoser economic relations between 
state trading and private enterprise economies are not basically of a 
technid character. To a considerable extent they reflect mutual lack 
of confidence. A lessening of international tensions and a rebuilding 
of coddence wouM help to remove them. 
127. Disarmament would bring about a change in the camposition 
and rate of growth of output and thus affect the structure and rate of 
expansion of world trade. While the composition of the non-military 
production that would replace military output cannot be precisely 
foreseen, it appears to be a safe assumption that all the main mtegories 
of civilian output would increase their share in national product. In w 
far as hereased investment and greater economic aid would accelerate 
tlie rate of economic growth in developed and under-developed countries, 
a more rapid mpansion of world trade could be anticipated. However, 
there are more immediate eEects that might follow the shift in demand; 
these hinge on the difference between the import content of military 
expenditure and the import content of the increments to consumption, 
investment and foreign aid that disarmament would facilitate. 
128. It is possible in principle to estimate the import content of 
any country's military expenditure, as well as of the civilian expenditure 
tbat would replace it, by means of an analysis of an economy's inter- 
industry structure. Such an analysis would indicate whether a shift 
from military wcpenditure to, say, housing construction would result in 
a net.increase or a net decrease in the demand for imports both in the 
=regate and for specific commodities, 
129. Some exports of priniary prodttcts, such as petroleum, rubber 
and most metallic ores depend significantly at present on direct and 
i n d i e  demand generated by military purchases. An estimate of this 
dependence with respect to the United States economy is summarized in 
annex 3, table 3-3. These figures show, for instance, that the direct 
and indiiect demand for copper generated by United States military 
expenditure in 1958 amo~~nted to 7.8 per cent of that year's total worId 
asupply and to 7.4 per cent of the supply in 1959. On the assumption 
that the demand generated by the combined military outlays of all 
industrialized countries may be abut twice as large as that computed 
for the United States alone, the table indicates that some 15-16 per 
cent of world copper output has served, directly and indirdy,  military 
purposes (see columns 3 and 4). For tin, nickel, lead and zinc the 
corresponding figure is over 9 per cent : for petroleum, between 8 and 
9 per cent. In view of the wdl-known sensitivity of the prices of these 
products to changes in demand, the elimination of all armament ex- 
penditure. if there were m offsetting rise in civilian demand, could have 
a seriousIy adverse effect on the income of those underdeveloped coun- 
tries whose exports consist largely of such raw materials. 
130. Table 3 4  (in annex 3) shows, however, that the demand 
of tbe United States and of the world far these raw materials wwid 
be reduced only ftactionally-by less than 2 per mt-if the efimination 
of military expenditure were accompanied by a corresponding increase 
in private and public non-militarg expenditure. These hflothetica] 
estimates, it should be noted, are based on the assumption h t  rivate 
ammmpion, investment, non-military government purchuu A other 
catemnes of nonlnilitary demand would all in- in the same pro- 
portion. However, since the content of these raw materials in military 
production does not differ significantly from that of the most im 
categories of non-military production, the impact on over-all r-' emand 
for the items listed in the table would appear to be only marginal for 
any likely change in the composition of civrliaa demand. 
131. S i  the importance of military expenditure for most other 
,primary commodities is smaller than for those dimmed above, ib 
cessation, even if not offset by an e q d  incxae in non-military ex- 
penditure, would produce a d e r  peweatage of reduction in demand 
I :dor them. The realtocation of miIitary expenditure to non-military put- 
probably bring about a net increase in this demand. T'he 
I calculations made for the United Slates and the United 
instance, suggest that this docatinn would increase the 
both food and clothing and thus for fcadstu&~ and textile 
v'mteds in general, 
I 132. Sme disarmament may be T d to result in an adera-  $tion of economic growth, it shodd 5 t h  te the growth of demand ht 
"primary production in pe ta l .  Coupled with the fact that disarmament 
, should be associated with a tendency for the advanced camtries to open 
their markets more widely to foodstuffs, for instance, this would make 
ifor a substantial growth of rirnary commodity trade. Accelerated eeo- 
jnomic growth would be st2 f more powerful in increasing total demand 
;for manufactures. In the past, an increased world demand for msrm- 
.;factures bas normally been w m i a t e d  with increased intmnationd tm& 
?in them. The tendency to reduce trade barriers should be prtieularly 
'important in enabling developing countries to increase their eKpwts of 
,manufactures to the more highly developed. 
133. The over-alI impact of disarmament on the trade of d r -  
,,developed countries is likely to be favourable, not only beaus? of the 
1 accehation of economic growth but also because of the greatly expanded 
iaid to be expected from the mme advmeed countries. Bath private 
#enterprise and centraUy planned economies should also be prepred t.a 
iopen their markets more widely to underdeveloped countries once the 
trade restrictions imposed for seeurity reasons are lifted. There might, 
:however, be instances in which declines in demand for particular com- 
:modities would cause appreciable dfimlties. In these cases considem- 
tion should be given to special aid for the cotmtries concerned, m the 
-same way as for particular industries or areas within the principal dis- 
arming countries. 
134. The immediate impact of disarmament on international em- 
nmic relations during the conversion period is a matter that needs 
to be given careful study along with the other conversion problems 
already discussed in chapters 3 and 4. Changes in the level of agfeete 
economic activity associated with disarmament in the major m ustrlal 
8 countries would be a major determinant of the level of i n t m m t i d  
trade during the conversion period. h the international field, as in the 
domestic, nations need to be prepared to take whatever measures may 
L ' prove appropriate to facilitate the reallomtion of resources and to 
ensure that any temporary didomtima of economic life that might occur 
are m i n h k d .  The degree to which specid polides might be called for 
would depend partly on tbe s p e d  of the disarmament process. 
135. If appropriate steps are taken it should be possible even in 
the short run to avoid any significant reductions in the general Ievel of 
primary product prim, but it needs nevertheless to be realized that 
any Mure to acbieve this goal could have serious consequences, For 
many of the countries mainly dependent on the export of primary com- 
modities, a percentage decline in their export earnings which might ap- 
r small arithmetically could cause grave damage. For example, a rp Cent drop in their average export prices, were it to take place, 
would imply for the under-developed countries a decline in their foreign 
exchange earnings equivalent to something like one-half of all official 
economic pants and loans currently received from abroad in a year.' 
Recessions in activity in the industrial countries have aused declines 
of this order of magnitude in the recent past. Concerted international 
@on would, therefore, be required to prevent any such decline in the 
pnces and Incomes of primary producing countries as a result of dis- 
armament. 
136. Even with favourable prospects for total trade, however, 
special problems might arise during the conversion period for 
r-lllar countries or for trade in particular commodities. One such pmb em stems 
from the fact that a few countries have been receiving considerable 
foreign exchange from military aid and military expenditure, including 
the outlays of foreign personnel. In these cases, special attention should 
be given to the possibility of arranging future programmes of develop- 
mental assistance, and especially their timing, so as to avoid adverse 
effects an their balances of payments. 
137. A more wide-spread problem relates to particular countries 
that are largely d ndent an the export of those commodities for 
which world damn T= might suffer a temporary decline. In conjunction 
with the formulation of any disarmament programme, therefore, it is 
highly desirable that a detzuled study be undertaken on the changes in 
demand for the various primary commodities which would result from 
disarmament. The reduction of strategic stockpiles of primary com- 
modities should be planned in such a way as to =use a minimum of 
disturbance to international markets, and consideration should be 'ven 
to the adequacy of already existing compensatory measures anfthe 
pmibi1ity that additional measures might be required during the con- 
version period. Regardless of the technique employed, no country should 
be dowed to suffer a disruption to its economio life, even temporarily, 
as a result of disasmament. 
'In 1956-1959 tht sum of net oficiaI donations and offidal net long-term 
lending to under-deveIo@ countries averaged $32 billion annually, or a b u t  126 
per cent of the $252 billton annual average value of tbese countries' exports during 
the same period. (See, resppetivtly, United Nations, Inr#mtiomI Flow o Law- a t q  Cu#ital and Oficial Donutipas, 1951 -1959 (Sales Na : 62.II.D.l) , ta e 3 and 
Umtd Nafioys, Morhhly B~rllefrv of Statuhc~, February 1962, table 43. The two 
sets of stattsbcs dlffer somewhat m country coverage.) 
CHAPTER 6 
TEE E-S OF DlS- ON TEE VOLUME AND 
E%AMEWORK OF AID FOR ECONOMIC DEVEU)EWENT 
138. The promotion of economic and d a l  developat in under- 
developed countries is one of the most imprtant ways in which the 
resources released by disarmament could be put to use. Two-thirds of 
the world's population lives in countries that obtain onIy a modest part 
of the benefits which modern technology and science are mpbIe of 
providing. The peoples of the underdeveloped aras are determined to 
raise their levels of living, and the peoples of the more industrialized 
countries have undertaken to help them do so. Progress has been made 
since the Second World War in raising real incomes per capita in many 
under-developed countries. The platrning of economic and sdal  develop- 
ment has been intensified in some and initiated in others, and the 
mobilization of domestic resources for national development has become 
a major policy objective. Tn many instances, domestic resources have 
been supplemented by foreign loans, grants, private mpital flows and 
technical assistance. 
139. National efforts and international co-operation in the devel- 
opment of the under-developed countries have so far not brought: about 
I the desired acceleration of economic growth. The average rate of growth 
in per capita income aver the past decade was still Iess than 2 per cent 
per annum, and possibly as little as 1 per cent-l The absolute gap 
between per capita incomes of rich and oor countries has been progre  R sively widening.8 Even if future growt in the developed areas is left 
out of account and t)le present levels of income in the developed areas 
are taken as a target, the recent experience of under-dweloped areas 
still appears disappointing. In under-developed areas the average level 
of real income per capita is now less than one-sixth--and in many of 
I them less than one-tenth--of that enjoyed in such countries as Belgium, 
Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom, Consequently, a future 
p w t h  rate no higher than 2 per cent per annum couId be expected 
I to raise t h e  level of living in poor countries to that now prevailing in 
the countries just mentioned only after a very long time. 
I 
140. An acceleration of the rate of growth of under-developed 
countries depends upon many factors, including the adoption of ap- 
propriate national development programmes and, in many cases, social 
and institutional reforms. Among these programmes an important roIe 
'Owing to the margin of error in the population estimates of many under- 
developed countries (especiaIly the intcrsensd estimates), estimates of r-I income 
in thest areas, which are rather crude in any cane, arc subject to an even wider 
ma'n of error when expressad in per capita terms. 
To narrow the gap, under-developed areas must experiaw a substadally 
higher growth rate than the more advanced areas, dnet in the higher-income a r m  
a given rate of growth implies much larger absolute increments to income 
must be assi td to encouragement of productive investment both from 
domestic an r foreign resources. To this end world disarmament could 
make a major contribution. Despite the inadequacies of the available 
statistics, it appears that the world's military expenditures far exceed 
the combined gross investment expenditures of the less developed areas ; 
&ey are probably at least five times as large and may bt much greater. 
A much larger volume of resources could thus be allocated to investment 
for productive development in these countries wen if only a fraction 
of the r e s w m  currently devoted to military purpases were used in 
this way. 
141. Assuming that the necessary national development pro- 
grammes and social and institutional reforms were effectively realized, 
under-developed countries would be able to absorb a considerably 
larger flow of productive investment. The consequent effect upon the 
rate of growth may be illustrated by a hypthetiml example in which 
it is assumed that these countries devoted half of the resources l~hratcd 
by disarmament to investment in productive capacity and that at the 
same time the rate of total capital flow from more advanced countries 
(both private enterprise and centrally planned) rose to around $15 
billion annually, or somewhat more than I per cent of their aggregate 
national product. This is a modest increase in view of the 8 or 9 per 
cent they now devate to military purposes. Under these conditions, the 
less advanced countries might be expected to increase their annual rate 
of growth of national product from, say, 3 per cent to 5 per cent. 
Assuming an annual rate of population growth of around 2 per cent, this 
could mean a trebIing of the rate of incrmse in per capita income fiom 
I per cent to 3 per cent. 
142. The hypothetical example just given is based on certain 
assumptions concerning income and investment and their interrelation- 
ship in under-developed areas. Although different sets of assumptions 
would inevitably lead to somewhat different estimates of acceleration in 
the rate of prowth in underdeveloped areas, there clearIy emerges the 
genera1 conclusion that disarmament could bring about a marked increase 
in the rate of growth of real income in the poorer parts of the world. 
143. These conclusions are reinforced by a comparison of the 
volume of resources now being devoted to military use with the various 
estimates made in recent years of the external financial needs of the 
underdeveloped countries. Four relatively comprehensive estimates of 
global aid requirements are available? apart from a number of estimates 
I 
*These estimates of hanciaI needs are W on fragmentary data. nKp have 
been c a m w e d  in a United Nations dncummt prepared for the Committee on a 
United Nations Capital Development Fund: The Ca+it&l Dmelopmmt Hcc& of 
fkb Leas Dmelobed Contlh'e~ (A/AC.!02/51. The earliest estimate is contained in 
a report prepared for the United Natrons: Mrarures for the Economic Dmlop-  
mrmt of Under-Dmeloped Camttr'rs (Sales No.: 51.IT.B.2). Its estimates con- 
cerned the nineteen-fifties, and were bawd on data for 1949 and earlier year#. 
The second estimate is crmbined in Max F. M i l f ~ k n  and W. W. htm, 
A ProMml. Key to an Efective For&a Policy (New York, 19561. It i s  based on 
data for 1953 and earlier years. The third edmatc, contained in Paul G. Hoffman, 
One Hrmdred Cwmtrics, One nnd One Quarter BilliPs Pcopk (Washinaton, 
IW), i s  h a d  on information available in 1959, and conems the dccade of tfte 
nineteen-sixties. The fourth is contained in P. N. Rosmstein-Rodan, "Intnna- 
tianal Aid for Under-dew!& Countriesu R& of Economics a d  SkrsiSt~~ 
(Carnbr ih  Mass.) XLTTI (Map, 1961) mh coven thc years 19621976. 
of aid needed for specific purposes. In these dcuIatioas, the total 
amount of foreign capital required by the under-developed areas, over 
and above their domestic resources devoted to invesbnent, is estimated 
to range f m  $6bidlion to $10 billion annually. These figures are based 
on conservative assumptions : the target rates of growth of per capita 
real income are about 2 per cent, and the computatims are based on 
assumed ratios between increments to real income and, on the one 
hand, increments to employment, or, on the other hand, increments to the 
st& of ca ital, which past experience suggests are reasonable but 
which cod d' conceivably turn out to have underestimated the capital 
needs should conditions prove to be less favourable than anticipated. 
After allowing for the present flow of foreign apital through existing 
institutions and arran ernents, the authors cited believe that there IS 
a deficiency of about f3 billion a year that needs to be made p o d  in 
order to achieve the modsst annual rate of growth ia i n m e  of 2 per 
cent per capita4 
f 44. Two further questions arise. First, would disarmament releasc 
in suffident quantity the particular resources required for economic 
development? Secondly, is the present institutional framework of aid to 
under-developed countries likely to be affected by disarmament? 
145. In the longer run, productive capacities can k adapted to 
any chanced patterns of demand, and provided that the needs of under- 
developed countries are known in sufficient detail, no serious probIems 
should arise in matching resources to uses. Even in the short run, how- 
ever, it seems probable that a significantIy large proportion of the 
resources absorbed for military tlse would indeed prove to be of a type 
useful for investment in under-developed countries. An important pro- 
portion nf military expenditure absorbs the output of heavy indusw 
and of the engheering and construction industries. The output of these 
industrial sectors cotrld undoubtedlv make a valuable contribution to 
the industrialization of the less developed areas and to their accumula- 
tion of social capital. Transportation and communication eouipment, for 
example, is an important component of military expenditure and is 
urgently reouired by under-developed countries. When a disarmament 
praEramme is adopted it would be desirable for Governments to estimate 
what resources would become available for peaceful purposes in the 
various stages of the Proeramme. Tn the light of these data and detail-ed 
information concerning the resources which underdweloped countncs 
could usefullv employ in their developmental prommmes. it would be 
possible for Governments to assess the share of the released resources 
to he allocated to the investment n a d s  of the Iess industrialized parts 
of the world. 
146. Disarmament would also release personnel. such as dentific 
research workers and engineers, who could be utilized for other purposes. 
!n the event of disarmament, it shotild prove possible for the industfiat- 
rzed countries to provide greater technical assistance and thereby help 
remove one of the serious limitations to development effotts in t h p  
fountrips. Ftrrthermore, disarmament would free from military semce 
m both the more advanced and the less developed countries hrge groups 
' Ibid. 
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of young people. Past experience in utilizing their good will and en- 
thusiasm in a number of countries indicates that when completely freed 
from military preoccupations, many of them could make an important 
contribution to economic and s o c d  development in under-developed 
areas. 
147. With respect to the impact of disarmament on the frame- 
work and structure of aid to under-developed countries s e d  points 
need to be made. If we leave out of account--as seems proper m the 
present context-short-term finance of all kind?, private grants, and 
military and defence-support aid, the principal ~nternational flows of 
mpital to under-deveIo& countries consist of (1) official grants, (2) 
official loans and credits on non-commercial terms, (3) long-term bans 
and credits on commercial terms made by national governments and by 
international authorities, and (4) private long-term loans or direct in- 
vestment. Unlike capital flows of the last three types, official grants do 
not, of course, burden the recipient country's balance of pa inents. d' Official loans and credits on non-commercial terms are less bur ensome 
than public or private lending on wrnmeraal terms: hence the distinc- 
tion between the second and third categories. 
148. Comprehensive statistics of loans and grants to under- 
deveIoped countries are not available according to the fourfold ckssifia- 
tion just mentioned. However, an impression of the over-all magnitude 
and composition of loans and grants to under-developed countries can be 
obtained from various sources! During the past few years the total net 
flow of capitaI, as just defined, from private enterprise developed a n -  
tries to under-developed countries averaged between $3.5 billion and 
$4 billion annually. Abut half represented official grants. The remainder 
consisted mostly of private lending. 
149. In the fifteen years fmm 1945 to 1960 the sum total of 
credits granted by the centrdly planned countries to underdeveloped 
countries and of mutual assistance among the centrally planned countries 
themselves amounted to about 52 billion old roubles. In the earlier years 
the greater part of the credits was granted to other centrally planned 
economies; in more recent years the emphasis has shifted to credits 
to under-developed countries. 
150. The increased international flow of capita1 f o under-developed 
countries that is certain to result from disarmament could take any one 
or more of the forms referred to above. Their relative importance would 
be likely to change, however, since each of them would be affected 
somewhat differently by the implementation of a disarmament pro- 
m e .  
151. As regards the flow of private -pi&!, it may be assumed 
that this would continue to respond to commercial considerations. 
Diminished worId tension resulting from disarmament, coupled with 
additional means of encouraging private foreign investment in undei- 
developed countries, might be expected to lead to a greater movement 
of private capital into these countries. 
@Sac Inlmmfi'otrol Flow o Long-term Copitat and O#5clof Dorurfiow, 195l- 
1959 (Sales Na : 621I.D.l) p. 1, and World Ecommc S w e y ,  1960 (Sale# 
Na : 61.XI.C1), pp. 119-121. 
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152. At the present time, nine-tenths or more of OW grants 
and loans are given under bilateral proflames. Bilateral and multi- 
lateraI programmes of aid each have their own particular advantages 
and disadvantages, and many of the considerations which now prompt 
Governments to favour bilateral rather than multilateral aid might con- 
tinue to hold gmd even in a disarmed world. On the other hand, in so 
far as political circumstances have had any weight in determining the 
direction and form of aid, effective disarmament and the related lessening 
of international tensions should improve the prospects for more co- 
I operative internationa1 action. 
153. The discussions that have been held in the Economic and 
Social Council and the General Assembly during the part eight years 
concerning the need for an increased flow of aid through an international 
fund within the framework of the United Nations bave frequently em- 
~ F i z e d  the importance of the savings to be &rived from general 
dsamament. The basic position of the General Assembly on this matter 
d, r e e n s  resolution 724 (VIII), adopted unanimously in 1953. Under 
this resolution the General Assembly made the following declaration: 
"We, the Governments of the States Membprs of the Uniicd Nations, 
in order to promote higher standards of living and conditions of economic 
and social progress and development, stand ready to ask our voples, when 
s d u e n t  progress has been made in internationally supervised world-wide 
disarmament, to devote a portion of the savings acbieved through such dia- 
armament to  an international fund, witbin the framework of the United 
Nations, to assist development and reconstruction in under-developd 
countries!' 
154. It should be realized that the repayment of bans granted on 
commercial terms may impose heavy burdens on the balances of pay- 
ments of these countries. Concern has already been expressed in recent 
years regarding the heavy accumulated indebtedness of a number of 
countries and the growing dif3iculties they have been experiencing in 
servicing outstanding loans. It seems urgent that as large a proportion 
of economic aid as possible should take the form of grants or "soft', 
loans. Disarmament would likely facilitate the increased flow of such 
aid. This is so because the saving.s afforded by disarmament w d d  
provide the aid-giving countries with a favourable o M t y  to 
increase their assistance without imposing an additions PP" burden on 
civilian expenditure. This should also l a d  to a desirable broadening 
of the existing basis of aid to include types of projects not adequately 
covered under existing policies, and should therefore facilitate a bal- 
anced execution of development plans. Increased aid in the fields of 
social investment should also become possible, as it is now generally 
recognized that substantial investment in health facilities and particularly 
in education is a prerequisite for obtaining the maximum bendits from 
other development efforts. 
155. Because the competing claims in developed countries are 
also urgent, there is a serious possibility that the financial resources 
released by disarmament might be rapidly absorbed by purely national 
aims. It is therefore desirable that an appro riate proportion of these 
resottrces should be allocated to internah0 mf aid in its various forms 
sirnuIhneously with their use for domestic purposes. 
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156. It must be emphasized that foreign aid a n  play only a 
supplementary role in the development of these countries and that the 
respnsibity for initiation and intensification of development efforts 
wouId continue to lie entirely with the governments and peoples con- 
cerned. There are many countries in which foreign exchange resourca 
are by no means the only nor wen the main Emhition on the rate of 
economic growth. Such countries are not likely to be in a position to 
utilize larger amounts of aid effectively unless they take the domestic 
measures rfecessary to encourage such growth. There is reason to look 
to the major powers to be generous in aIlomting resource freed by 
disarmament to the development of underdevelo ed countries. But 
there is also every reason to Iook to the under- g eveloped countries 
themselves to create the conditions favourable to their economic growth. 
In this as in other fields discussed in this report, advance plannrng and 
prepmtion are likely to enhance greatly the favourable impact of 
general: disarmament. 
CHAPTER 7 
SOME SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DXS- 
157. The economic and social consequences of disarmament are 
inextricably intertwined. As already discussed, it would be possible to 
bring about a significant improvement in many aspects of d Iife, 
provided that some of the resources released by disarmament were 
earmarked far fields such as education and scientific research, hdth, 
housing and urban development. An idea of the magnitude of the needs 
in these fields has ken given in chapter 2. There are, however, some 
aspects of s o d  life which elude measurement, but which none the less 
greatly a%& individual and family life and on which smoother humaa 
relations within and between nations largely depend. 
158. In  a disarmed world. a general irn~ovement codd Ix ex- 
pected in the lwei  of iizting and in the candit~ons of under-privileged 
and low-income groups such as the old and retired people whose share 
in the social well-being is often meagre, even in the more developed 
countries. With the end of the armaments race, Governments would 
accord these social objectives a highex priority than in the ast. The 
cumulative diffusion of social benefits. 
Y implementation of measures discussed in chapter 2 would ead to a 
159. The more rapid rate of economic growth and the increase in 
productivity that may be expec!ed to result from disarmament might 
weU permit a reduction in work~ng hours, an improvement in the coa- 
ditions of work and a lengthening of paid vacahons. To take full ad- 
vantage of the resultant longer leisure and the higher level of living, 
wider cultural facilities would be required. In this context, eduation 
acquires special significance as a means for disseminating culture. 
160. In the domain of p e r s o d  and f w i J y  life, disarmament and 
recession of the threat of war would decrease tensions which often bring 
about psychosomatic illnesses. Human Iife would acquire a new meaning, 
once war and preparations for war were eliminated. The whole prospect 
of life would be brightened, especially for young peopIe about to enter 
a profession or found a family, There would no longer be any separa- 
tion from the family for compulsory military service, so that the 
psychological, moral and material evils which this creates would IE 
avoided. A greater stability in the family nucleus would be likely to 
exert a favourable influence on m a d t y .  
161. The very fact of disarmament would lead to a diminution 
of tensions between nations and races. The tendency to divert: individual 
and national frustrations into national and racial hatreds would be 
lessened significantIy. 
162. In a disamed world, the danger that 'security considerations 
and armed forces might play an excessive role in farming the values 
of the community would be eliminated. It is important to note, however, 
that attention would need to be paid to mnstructive outlets for individual 
and collective aspirations. 
163. If confidence is one of the necessary conditions for rwnclud- 
ing a disarmament agreement, an increase of confidence would also be 
one of its happiest consequences. A decrease in tensions and in the 
influence of groups interested in armaments would bring about a 
profound change in the form and content of m k ? ~ ~ t h d  WMOW. 
Political and economic conflict between nations, with its attendant risk 
of war, would more rapidIy be repIaced by constructive ~ ~ ~ u l a t i o n .  
Scientific co-operation between nations would advance more rapidly, and 
the peaceful utilization of science and technology w?dd be accelerated. 
The arts, too, would greatly benefit fmm an densron of internationd 
exchanges. AU the great civilizations in the past have gained fiom such 
cultural contacts and have exerted their influenee beyond their own 
frontiers. Disarmament would remove the main barriers to the far 
greater exchanges that are now technically possible. Humanity would 
thus be able to carry out co+peratively the projects which Iie beyond 
the resources of a single country or a group of countries. 
164. In short, disarmament would release resources from uses 
in which they are not only wasted but also in many ways make the 
remainder of mankind's wealth less effective in rotnoting welfare than P it would otherwise be. In reckoning the gains rom it, one must take 
into account a general easing of tension and frustration and an enhanced 
possibility of co-operation that would reinforce the direct economic 
contribution of the resources released. 
163. In view of this, as well as the conclusions reached in previous 
chapters, there should be no doubt that the diversion-to peaceful pur- 
poses of the resources now devoted to military expenditure could and 
should be of benefit to all countries and would lead to improvement 
of world social conditions. 
CHAPTm 8 
SUMMARY rn CONcLUsiONs 
166. The present level of military expenditure not ady represents 
a grave politid danger but also imposes a heavj economic and social 
burden on most countries. It absorbs a large volume of human ind 
material resources of all kinds, which could h used to increase em- 
wmic and social welfare throughout the world-both in the highly in- 
dustrialized countries, which at the present time incur the bulk of the 
world's military expenditures, and in the less developed areas. 
~ o U R C E S  DEVOTED TO MILITARY PWRWGES 
. - 
167. There app-rs to be general agreement that the world is 
spending roughl $120 billion annually on military account at the 
present time. ~ i i r  corresponds to about one-half of the total gross 
capital formation throughout the world. It is at least two-thirds of- 
and according to some estimates, of the same order of magnitude as 
-the entire national income of all the underdeveloped countries. 
168. It is important that countries, in preparing to disarm, should 
take stock of the various resources that disarmament would r e l e  for 
peaceful uses. In the major military powers, military production. 5 
highly concentrated in a few industry groups. In those coun*es that 
reIy upon imports for their supplies of military goods or in which the 
major part of military expenditure is for the pay and subsistence of the. 
armed forces, rather than for their equipment, the resources devote& 
to military purposes consist essentia1Iy of manpower and foreign 
exchange. 
- -  - 
,, - THE PEACEFWL USE OF ~ E A S ~  R ~ C E S  
'J  169. There are so many competing clai~ns for usefully employing 
&e resources released by disarmament that the r d  problem is to 
establish a scale of priorities. The most urgent of these claims would 
undoubtedly already have been largely satisfied were it not for the 
armaments race. 
170. Increased personal consumption might well absorb a large 
l a r e  of the released resources. A substantial portion of them, however,, 
would be used for expansion of productive capacities bemuse only such_ 
expansion can provide a firm basis for further increases in consumption.. 
In the less developed countries, the utilization of released resources for 
capital formation must be considered vitally important. 
' 171. Social investment is an important alternative both to p r i v a ~  
consumption and to industrial and agricultural investment. Its daims 
rest partly upon the clmr urgency of the direct need for improved e jd  
47 
48 ~mnumic and mdal cpnrequmua of di-wmm, YO& I 
amenities, and pady upon the fact that growth of industrial and @- 
cultural rductivity is dependent upon developments in sducat.10~1, 
housing, 71 ealth, and other fields. 
172. The release of scientific and technical manpower would make 
it possible to enmurage programttles of basic scientific research in fields 
which have hitherto been neglected. Disarmament would also open u 
possibilities for joint international ventures of an ambitious kind, s & 
as the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, space research, 
the exploration of the Arctic and Antarctic for the benefit of tnankifid 
and projects to change the climates of large areas of the world. 
173. Thus, though it would take active decisions by Governments 
in the light of national and international needs to set in motion the 
necessary progmmmes for employing the released resources, it seems 
abundantly clear that no country need fear a lack of useful empIoymcnt 
opportunities for the resources that would become avaiIable to it through 
disarmament. 
IMPACT ON NATION& PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT 
174. Disarmament would raise both general problems of main- 
&inkg the aver-all level of economic activity and employment and 
specific problems in so far as manpower or productive capacity might 
require adaptation to non-military needs. In the economic life of all 
countries, shifts in the pattern of demand and in the allocation of 
productive resources are continually occurring. The reallocation of 
productive resources which would accompany disarmament is in m y  
respects merely a special case of the phenomenon of economic growth. 
175. The post-war conversion was a much larger one and involved 
a more rapid transfer of resources than total disarmament would r uire 
at present. Nevertheless, huge armies were quickly demobilized wit *t, out 
a significant rise in unempIoyment m most countries. The pace of 
recwery, particularly of industrial output, was impressively rapid. Dur- 
ing the post-war conversion, however, the major concern of economic 
policy was to restrain, xather than to maintain, over-all demand. 
176. Much attention has already been in the industrialized 
p h t e  enterprise economies to the methods by which total effective 
demand can be maintained. Monetary and fisml policy could be used 
to off set the e f f e  of a shortfall in total demand that might result fiom 
a decline in military expenditure to the extent that it were not offset by 
a rise in civil government expenditure. Bearing in mind that a substmtial 
part of military expenditure would probably be replaced by other govern- 
ment expenditure in most countries, it may be concluded that the 
maintenance of effective demand in the face of disarmament should not 
prove difiidt. 
177. For many underdeveloped countries, the effect of disarma- 
ment upon the industrial countries' demands for primary products, and 
thus on the export earnings of the primary producing countries, would 
be of great importance. So wouId the methods of dealing with the 
liquidation of strategic stockfles. 
178. In the centraIIy planned economies, the maintenance of 
effective demand while reducing miIitary expenditure would be simply 
a nratBm of the &&cy of planning tscbdiques. In masq- 
effective d m d  could be readily maintained, and tkpimigd prdaaa 
of conversion wwld concern the physid adaptation of p h b  producing 
srmrments to the production of goods for civilian use. 
179. Ewn with the sumesful maintenance of total efldvc ddt- 
d during a period of disarmament, W c a n f  problems sf adjust- 
mcnt would remain in spec& sectors and areas of the ec~mmy. The 
resources now supplying military requiremeats muld be adapted to 
peace-time needs partly by shifts within industries and plants. Tbia might 
be a relatively easy procedure, in many cases involving little more tbatr 
& q e s  in designs, retooling, and minor adaptations of sbdUs, par- 
ticularly in plants and enterprises wbich already produce bath mil* 
and civilian goods. Shifts between industries would n e c d h b  new 
investment and acquisition of different ty es of skill by the working 
farce. In the longer run disarmament woul X allow each country to raise 
the rate of investment and to adapt productive capacity more adequately 
to tbe needs of the population and to the requirements of econamic 
grqwtfi, h t h  in the private enterprise and the centrally p h m d  tcorn- 
Mules. 
180. Hypothetiml studies on the assumption that military ex- 
pendkre is replaced wholly by increases in expenditure on other kinds 
of g o d  and &ces suggest that in the event of very rapid dhma-  
merit some 6 or 7 per cent (including the armed forces) of the total 
labur form in the United States and 354 to 4 per cent in the United 
Kingdom would have to find civilin instead of military employment 
or c h q e  their employment from one industry group to another. These 
s h i h  would be small if spread out over a ntrmber of years and w a d i  
be gready facilitated by the normal process of turnover. The higher the 
fate. of growth of the economy, the easier the p a a s  of adaptation. 
181. Under-dewloped countries generally have heen meet@ 
their requirements for military goods and services by imports, so that 
their disarmament would release foreign excbange rather than industrial 
workers. It would also free members of the forces, many with useful 
skills and training. Some of these could k usdully employed in the 
development of social capital. In some of the semi-industrialized coun- 
tries, newly started basic industries 4 d  concentrate, without any 
transitional diflicdty, on the manufacture of capital goods. 
W. In the centrally lanned economies, where productive cap 
is us- m y  u t i d  it would be necessary to convert plants 
producing military equipment to produetion of durable consumer go& 
md of st& investment goals  as mn be produced in them with d y  
mittor retooling. This could be done rapidly. 
183. Some special problem would arise with regard to re 
ment and training af manpower and reorientation of &en& Z s  
While most m e m k s  of the armed forces have received t & G q  that 
wsarld fit them a i I y  for civilian life, a specid effort would have to be 
ma& to &nd s- euapIoy~aent for tfie rest. The dtmd%zath d 
the ~ ~ s i o n a l  fnrmbs of the armed forces would jmp?y +am@ 
that the number of new entrants for that period would be augmented 
by this s p e d  factor. 
184. In industries depending heavily rn military orders, many of 
the employees possess a level of skill that should find gainful mploy~ 
ment in other branches of production, so logg w over-all eEective 
demand is rising. Even so, there might be some special cases which 
would r uire special assistaace to encourage the adaptation d skills 
to new j 8 s .  The uneven gcogrqhieal distribution of the activity b a d  
on military expenditure would give rise to a need for various fwms of. 
public and other assistance to facilitate readjustment. - .  
185. The task of shifting scientific and technical persmd to ndg- 
military fieIds of research in some cotintries would be considerable. 'No 
teduction in the actual employment of scientific and technid Nsonnef 
need be feared, however, because the demand for civilian r ~ d r ' w o u l a  
increase rapidly. . . 
IMPACT OH INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RUTIONS 
186. Disarmament would be bound to have hourable d e c t s  on 
the development of internatianal relations. The political dEteufe that 
would accompany an international disarmament programme w o a -  in' 
itself imply that nations were willing to reconsider their qonomic 
relations with one another. The relaxation of inteindtoaal tqsiws 
would provide a sound basis for reduction of trade ,barriers and foi 
modihtion of existing trade agreements and trading practices.. 'h 
important consequence of this would be s substantial increase in trade 
between the centrally planned economies and the rest of ths world, . - 
187. Since disarmament may be ex-d to result in an ace+& 
h of economic growth, it sl~ould stimulate the growth of d-hd 
for primary production in generd. Accelerated economit growth waul4 
be still more powerful in increasing total demand for manufacture$. T ~ F  
over-all impact of disarmament on the trade of under-dweloped coun- 
tries is likely to be favourable, not only bebecause of the aderation & 
q n o m i c  growth but also because of the greatly expanded aid to be 
expected from the more advanced countries. 
188. Some exports of primary products, such as petroleum, rubber, 
and most metallic ores, depend significantly at present on direct and 
indirect demand generated by military purchases. Provided, howev,, 
that miIitary expenditure were fully replaced by public and p r i m  non- 
miIitary spending, the impact on over-ail demand for these commodities 
would be only minor. There might, however, k instances.,in whi& 
wries in demand for particular commodities would muse appreciable 
difiicultieg. In these cases consideration should be given to special aid. 
for the countries concerned, b the same way as for particular industries 
or areas within the principd disarming countries. For most other 
primary commodities, the rallocation of military ex nditure to uvilisn 
use would probably bring about a net increase in cr emand. 
189. During the conversion period changes in the lwel of ag- 
gregate economic activity associated with dismament in the Gjor. 
industrial countries would be a wjbr debnbant of the lev4 pf 
I - .  , , Slrmmar). end ~~ 51 international trade. It is believed &at significant fluctuations in the 
general Ievel of international trade could be avoided, but it should 
neveqheless realized that any failure to achieve this g o a l . . d  have 
serious consequences. Regardless of the technique employed, no' counm 
should be allowed to suffer a disruption to its economic life, even tern; 
porarily, as a result of disarmament. 
1 .. . . .. 
" !' EFFECTS ON THE VOLUME AND ~AMRWORK OF- AID' . 
. . 
E ~ ~ ~ O M I C  DlWELOP-MEEfT . . 
I 190. National efforts and international co-operation in the de- 
velopment of the under-developed countries have so far not brought 
about the desired acceleration of economic growth. A much larger 
volume of resources could be altoated to i n v h e n t  for productive 
development in these countries even if only a fraction of the resourc.es 
currently devoted to military purposes were used in this way. Dls- 
armament could thus bring about a marked increase in the rate of 
growth of r a l  income in the poorer parts of the world. 
191. Bilateral and multilateral programmes of aid each have their 
own particlllar advantages and disadvantages, but in so far as F t i d  
circumstances have had any weight in determining the directton and 
form of aid, effective disarmament and the related lessening of inter- 
national tmsions should improve the prospects for more co-opmtive 
internationa! action. Since repayment of loans granted on commercia! 
terms may Impose heavy burdens on the bdances of payments o,f the 
under-developed countries, as large a proportion of economic ard as 
possible should take the form of grants or "soft" loans. 
192. Because the competing ckims in developed countries are 
also urgent there is a *rims possib111 that the financial resources 
released by disarmament mi ht be rapid y absorbed by purely national 7 ' '7aims. It is therefore desirab e that an appropriate proportion of thm 
resources should be allocated to international aid in its various foms 
simultaneously with their use for domestic purposes. 
193 Foreign aid, however, can play only a supplementary role in 
I 
the development of these countries and the res ibility for initiation r and intensification of development efforts wod continue to lie entirely 
I with the Governments and peopks concerned. 
SOME SOCIAL CONSEQVENCBS 
194. In a disarmed world, a general improvement codd k ex- 
pected in the level of living, including an increase in leisure, With the 
end of the armaments race, Govements w d d  m r d  social objectives 
a higher priority. The psychological, moral and material evils of ccm- 
pulsory military s h c e  and of stationing troops away-from their homes 
would be avoided; so would the danger that s w r r t y  considerations 
and the armed forces might play an extensive role in forming the 
d u e s  of the community. Scientific co-operation and the arts would 
benefit from an extension of international exchanges, 
195. Tbe Consultative Group is unanimously of the opinion that 
all the problems and difficulties of transition connected with disarmament 
could be met by appropriate national and international measures. There 
should thus be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the 
resources now in military use couId be accomplished to the benefit of 
all countries and lead to the improvement of world economic and soda1 
conditions. The achievement of general and complete disarmament 
would be an unqualified blessing to all mankind. 
A N N E X E S  
Raso~mow 1516 (XV), A- BY THB GENSRAL A==Y 
The G& Assembly, 
Recalling its resolution 1378 (XIV) of a0 Nwembcr 1959, 
Cob that tbe impact of d i m e n t  i s  likly to set in d n  great 
chaoges in the domestic economies of States and in inknational ceonomic rcla- 
timq as a result of the progressive diwrsion of human and mattriPl re- 
@xi military to peaceful purposes, 
R*cog&kg that &c~tiue action at the national an13 intvaatiod levels 
nead to be tska to mnltE use of xmtcriai and human resourocs becoming adable  
pa a o~nasqtrtncc of disarmamtot, in order to promote d a l  progress and ktaer 
standards of liviag in the work& 
B w  im i d  the importance of compmhenaive and systematic snrdito in 
this hid  to enable Member States, crpedally tho* which are underdeveloped, 
make the necessary economic and social adjustments in the event of d i s ~ c t l t ,  
Cost&wed that it is both timely and desirable to un- such studies, 
1. Requests th Seuetary-Gmcral to examine: 
(a) The national economic aud social consequences of disarmament in mum- 
'3i&&1 with different economic systems and at diderent stages of economic dealop 
mat, incldng, in particular, the problems of replacing military expenditures 
with alternative private and public evil txpenditures so as to maintah effective 
dtmatld and to absorb the human and material resources rtlcased from d t a r y  
I trses; 
(b) The possfik dwdopmcnt of struaural imbalatl~ks in national economics 
I a a ~CS& of the ~~9satWD of capital investment m armaments iaduptriits, and the 
adoption of possible corrective measures to prevent such imbalances, induding 
cxpm~dad capital assistance to the under-developed muntrits; 
(c )  The impact of disarmammt on interciatiad economic relations, including I it. e h t  on world trade and erpckdy o. the bade af under-developed co~mirits; 
(d) T h e  utilization of resmrccs relmed by disarmament for the purpose of 
economic and social developmmt, in particular of the undtr-deve1opsd wuntrits; 
2 Re~ommmd$ t&ai the Secretary-General &odd conduct tbe propod 
examination with the assistance of expert consultants to bt appointed by him with 
due regard to thdr qualifications and to the need of geographical representation 
I 
and intimate knowledge of countries with different economic systems and at 
Wamt 9tng;es of economic developmeat; 
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3. Akp~aLr to Governments of Member States to give full cospwation to the 
Secretary-General in the fulfilment of the task entrusted to him; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a preliminary r t p r t  on the 
results of the examination to the -Economic md Social Council at its thirty-third 
acssion ;" 
5. Requests the Economic and Swial Council to transmit the report with its 
views to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session. 
. 948th $knary meeting, 
15 December 1960. 
iF 2 - .  -.-*-. OFFICIAL &TART BXPEND~TU~B mXTES:Ti& - ' '--:nn.'l , , -.!> 
<3 
1. t&ormrtion r&ceming mi~tary eipendimre i. con- in t6r & i i j  
pubk accounts of central Governments md the n a t h d  accoubto Wing with 
-8. aationaI or material product and dated dak Cmmtriea =ti, howeyer, 
ia shdr W t i o n s  of military -&hue, and inforumtion z a ~ e r n i n g  -tltch 
m d d s  of &ssiiic&on & commonly not available. It is themhe  wt:h 
maag hatames to dererminc the content of &c official s t a W  from an d
view. Some expenditturn that w d d  k. wsidered as m i l p r y  
mwpomt may k excluded from the &cid data, &It aUwm'- 
*tdd-bt wnsidqed as non-military may k included. Xn addition; there a@, 
&udy &Termws witfiin c o u n ~ ~ ~ s  h the -basis of of milimy otngut- 
as compared with that of the output of thc -st of the em-, Tiwe d i f E e r y  
alone, even if the cweragc of tht expenditure- statistics were appropriatt, would 
makc it imgossibk to indicate with-any piecision the propdon of mdrms 
devoted to military wposera Furthermort, differept caumks.have different 
&nomid ~tnsctrucs a d  pattaw d prices, so that in compa* cmntriea one, 
wcidd obtain different ratios of military e x p d t u r e  to national product a i d  ik. 
wmymmts mady  from using the different price patterns. For dl these rdunsp: 
&&I s t a t h h  of military expenditure have only limited valut as a kads for 
&wing the cconomic burden imposed by the armaments race. . . 
2 The following tables include the mogt readiIy available official -tics 
og tditary vpcnditure and compare t h e  with d m d c  product aqd ikd.~gp&d: 
formation. T h e  tbree tables cover industrial private enterprise, atndcr-dtvdoped~ 
aad centrally planned countries respectively. In amordame with usud statia-, 
practk, the concept of domestic prodtact in the first two W s  is diffqmt from 
that in the third table. In tables 2-1 and 2-2, dome& prod& in&& 'm. 
&righating in both "material production'' and d e s .  In d 1 e  25, &me$& 
nod&, ineludes ~utput originating in material prodlaction ody. A furWr.&ier- 
a c e  js that d o p d  pr~dwt in *fes 2-1 and 2 2  is gross, dtpreciatian not ha* 
deducteg from gross investment or income, while domestic product in @bk 24 
3 ' n d  of depkhtiotr. Accordingly, ditarg urpcnditurc i s  compred with a *re 
h d &  defined mewre  of product in tables 2-1 and 2-2 than in table 9 .  . - . . .  : ' 5  
" 'In &% to-a &&ion b tbr: Group of Experts, made at W' 
session, the -orme Smicial ~bmd agmxi to d* c o n s l ~ t i o f i ~ ~ f % ~  
itan to its thirty-fudh session. 
c o d a  (million 
doIlars) : 
r 957 .............. 
J858 .. ;:.; ......... 
1959 .............. 
Average 1957-1959. . 
U ~ i t a d  States (million 
dolkis) : 
1957 .............. 
a 958 .............. 
1959 .............. 
Average 1957-1959. . 










lqS9 ..... , ......... 
kerage 1957-1959. . 
Bclg i~m (millbn 
francs) : 
1957 .............. 
1958 .............. .............. 
I 
1959 






byerage 719!S'-2959. . 










Average 1957-1959. . 





Average 1957-1959. . 
Vffirsd Kingdom 
(million pounds) : 
I957 .............. 
f 958 ...,....,..... 
1959 .............. 
Average 1957-1959. . 
O u w ~ r ~  











Average 1957-1959. . 
S o w :  United Nations, Stalislical Yearbook aad Yearbook of Ndional 
I 
A c c o u ~ s  Sfatklics, various issues. 
"For differences between the concept of domestic product used in tables 2-1 
and 2-2, as compared with table 2-3, see para. 2 of this annex. 
'Fiscal years kginaing 1 April 
' Including increase in stocks of local government enterpiiscs. 
' F i l  year ending 30 f une. 
' Excluding government expenditure on equipment. 
' Gross national product. 
Including increase in stocks. 
' Including expenditure on maintenance of roads and expenditure on motor 
vehicles for ptrsonal use. 
Tabb 2-2 
Cre::* &-A;* 
M a i w  CMU dkmt8ti.c G r w  w 
Cwnfry, pmmd and bud ct  domrdic w c ~ & f d  d ~ d l k  Cowl 





,1958 .. : ........... 
1959 .............. 
Average 1957-1959. . 
Umim of Smtk Afn'ca 








I958 .............. 6,924b 318,400.0 65,610.0 
1959 .............. 15,589+4a 604,547.0 107,985.0 
Ayerage 1958-1959. . 11,257.1' 461,474.0 -0 
Brosil (billion 
cruzeiros) : 
1957 .............. 34.6 l,M3.1 124.5 
1958 ........-..... 40.8 1,2993 165.6 
1959 .............. 41.1 1,837.4 228.5 
Average 1957-1959. . 38.8 1J99.9 I729 
Chile (miliion 
escudos) : 
1957 .............. 73.1 2223' 247.0 
1958 .............. 82.2 2,9718' 309.9 
1959 .............. 91.1 4,163.P a . 0  
A v w e  1957-1959.. 82.1 3,EU'  320.6 
Coiombia (million 
pesos) : 
1957 .............. 288A 17,651.0 2,630.0 
1958 .............. 306.4 m77.0 3,350.0 
1959 .............. 274.7 22,sss.o 3939.0 
Average 1957-1959. . 289.9 20,374-0 3,300.0 
Costa Rico (million 
colones) : 
1957 .............. 13.4 2,.30;3.F 434.8 
1958 .............. 12.8 2,465.01 4W.O 
1959 .............. 131 2,529.8' 451.4 
Average 1957-1959. . 13.1 2,432Sf 430. X 










3 959 .............. 















Average 1957-1959. . 874.7 
P m  (million soles) : 
1957 .............. 1,083.8 
.............. 1958 1,265.4 






Average 1957-1959. . 
Anil 





Averap 1957-1959. . 
Cumbodio : 
1957 .............. 
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Tobfs 2-2 (continued) 
GfWt 
Gross domsoic 
drfilhry &W ~ ~ M J I ~ C  &US: lExrd ~~AY~,P~@ bud ct donu& l t r d  cap!td b m d &  m#&I 







Average 1957-1959. . 
CAim (Taiwan) : 
Am= 1957-1959.. 
Fedmtion of Mulayu 




1957 .............. 2,828.0 114,100.0' . . . 
1958 .............. 2,787.0 124,W.O" ..- 
Average 1957-1958. . 2,m.O 119,450.0" ... 












KOYW (Re~ublu  of) 














1957 .............. 157.08 IO,I19.0 890.0 
---- I 61 - -- -C - -  - 




- -ceu*s*r, PnJos. 
Gma 
, a s m t J - w  
A m  e-j 
S* Arab Rapwblic 
(lnuiuu~rotmds) : .............. 1957 14aa 2,514.P 2(56A 5.6 526 
lW&d (million 
.............. 1957 1 #,@OD 6,434b 3A *%A .............. 1958 im.7 45,458.0 &asp.o .............. 1959 1,439B 411JNO& .r,&43 
A- 1957-1959.. 1.465.1 46m.0 ~ Z Q  32 21.3 
Twkey (Cmillion Iirw) : .............. 1957 959.1" 3mX8.0 4B33.0 
195s .............. %4# 
199 ............... tl&lc 
A~erarpe 199-1959.. 1,MO.S- 
EvmwE 
*tee (miIlipn 
m d m a a )  : 
1957 .............. 1,SW,0 
I953 .............. 4,560.0 
1959 ............... 4,mO 
A- t957-1399,. 4,550.0 
Pwfygd Imillian 
umdos) : 
19$7 .............. 1,7S4.0 
1m. ............... 1,845d 
Average 1957-1958. . 1,7994 
S#& (million 
P a s )  : 
l95T .............. 1 0 ~ 1 . 0  
Ckino (maidund) (million 
Y t m )  : 
1957 .................. 5,510 9 3 w  1&m' 
1958 .................. &W 1 Z S W  21,400O 
1959 .............. : ... 5,8M 152,MP 24,W0 





. - 1959 ............ .;. ... 
Average 1957-1959, ,. .. 
~ w t k  Gemlofly (million 
marks) : 
195s .................. 
PolonP (million zfotyy : 
jw ......-..a-......... 
1958 ................... 
: 1959: ................... 
Average 1957-1959:. ... 




.... Average 3957-199. 





Average 1957-1959.. ... 
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DIWO3 AND IHD- -MY DBYAtPfl POB PAW Y A W  
(As ~ C T E C I I ~ ~ ~ R  of Ikbk tow rrrorld wly 1958 and 1959) 
C-1 C-2 Cdu-3 0 - C  
Crude Petroleum ........................ 45 4. I &9 8.3 
Natural rubber (crude) .................. 1.5 1.4 3.0 29 
Metallie ores: 
Cogper ................................ 7.8 7.4 15.7 14.7 
Nickel ................................ 6.0 4.8 12.0 95 
Tin ................................... 4.9 4.7 9.8 9 3  
h a d  and zinc .......................... 4.7 4 3  9.4 9.4 
Molybdenum .......................... 4 2  3.4 8.3 6.8 
Bauxite ......,.................. ., .... 3.5 3.9 7.1 645 
Iron ore ................... ... ...... 26 2.5 5.3 4-9 
Mangmese ............................ 1.3 13 2.7 26 
chromite .............................. 1.1 1.1 2.3 22 
Sotracgs ~ r n  -ODS: Direct and indirect milw dtmand for raw material 
was computed from the worksheets for 'The EeonomK: Effects of Disarmamd 
(Couthwd m p. 66) 
Tabla 3-3 ( foo tnofe~ ,  continued] 
(by .W. W. Leontief and Marvin Hoffenberg, Sciefitilft Amdcas, April, 1961) 
&tamed from the EIsrrard Economics Research Projcet. World supplies d 
natural rubber are from Rubbw Statislicol Bulletira, 16:2 (November 1%1)., p. 2 
World supplies of mineral are from U.S. Department of the Interior, M 1 s d  
Yembook, 1959. POI. , pp, 124, 125. 
' Generated by $4,585 million of goods and services purchased under thc U.S. 
military budget of 1958. 
8A: a rough approximation, aszumed to be equal to twice the U.S. military 
exptndlture. 
(As  ~wcmlage of world srrpply, 1958 aed I P S )  
Crude petroleum ......................... -0.09 -0.08 4.18 -0.16 
Natural rubber (crude}. .................. 0.05 0.0s 0.10 0.09 
Metallic ores: 
Copper ................,.............. -0.96 -0.90 -1.92 -1.81 ........ N U  ..................... 4.76 -0.60 -1.51 -1ZI 
Tin .................................. 43 -432 -Oh? -d63 .......................... L a a d a d  h -0.32 b0.32 -0.64 -054 
MoIyWen~m ................... . .. ... -0.06 -0.05 4 . 1  -0.09 
Bauxite ............................... -0.52 -0.48 -1.04 -0.96 .............................. Iron me -0.04 -0.03 - 0 .  -4 .W 
Manganese ..................... ... -0.02 -0.02 4 0 4  -4d4 
m m t t e  ......................*m.-m*.. -0.~2 4 0 2  4 - 0 3  -0.m 
!bmm:Scet@e3-3.Ths ~inthistablcwcrederivo8bymultip' 
h ~ t e r p h l u h h h l c ~ l b o r c i n m l u m . 2 d W . - t i d . n ~  
H o Z ~ ,  Op. at, bble 8. 
"ad to $4fS,r000rn 
' A a s d  eqd to twice the United states dtq e x p d h m  

